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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF RACIAL
REDISTRICTING: A CRITIQUE OF SHAW v. RENO
Frank R. Parker*
INTRODUCTION

Redistricting after the 1990 Census resulted in historic increases in the number
of majority-black and majority-Hispanic congressional and legislative districts and
accompanying advances in the number of black and Hispanic members of
Congress and state legislators. State legislatures and federal and state courts
created additional majority-minority districts because they wanted to avoid
discrimination and believed such districts were required by Section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act to avoid a redistricting plan that resulted in discrimination, or in some
instances to remedy Justice Department objections under Section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act.'
In Shaw v. Reno2 white voters challenged two newly-created majority-black
congressional districts in North Carolina, contending in their complaint that raceconscious redistricting violates the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court,
by a 5-to-4 vote, held for the first time that plaintiffs could challenge bizarrelyshaped majority-minority districts as an equal protection violation, even though the
redistricting plan was racially neutral on its face and there were no allegations
that the plan was adopted for a racially discriminatory purpose or had a racially
discriminatory effect. Plaintiffs could state a constitutional violation, the Court
ruled, by alleging that the oddly-shaped districts "cannot be understood as
* Professor of Law, District of Columbia School of Law; former Director, Voting Rights Project.
Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law. The author is grateful for the research assistance of
Victoria Lucchesi, a recent graduate of the Class of 1995 at the District of Columbia School of Law, and for
information supplied by Wayne Arden in the preparation of this Article.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1988).
2. 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993).
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anything other than an effort to separate voters into different districts on the basis
of race, and that the separation lacks sufficient justification." 8
The Court's decision has enormous consequences for minority voters seeking to
overcome decades of discrimination in the electoral process and underrepresentation in Congress, state legislatures, and local governmental bodies. If the
Shaw decision is broadly interpreted to impose severe limits on the creation of
majority-minority districts, it would end the substantial progress in increasing
minority participation in legislative bodies made since the Voting Rights Act was
passed, and could produce the first reduction in minority representation in
Congress since the post-Reconstruction period. In addition, the decision is poorly
reasoned and inadequately grounded in constitutional doctrine. It raises serious
questions of standing to sue, application of the discriminatory purpose
requirement, lack of compactness as an essential feature of racial gerrymandering,
and compliance by states with the requirements of the Voting Rights Act.

I.

GAINS IN MINORITY REPRESENTATION FROM REDISTRICTING

Prior to the latest round of redistricting, minorities remained substantially
underrepresented in Congress and state legislatures. Despite a national voting age
population that is 11.1 % black and 7.3 % Hispanic, blacks made up only 4.9% of
members of Congress and 5.4 % of all state legislators, and Hispanics constituted
only 2.5 % of Congress and 1.7 % of state legislators."
After the 1990 Census, state legislatures and federal and state courts adopted
new redistricting plans that produced some of the largest increases in minority
representation since the Voting Rights Act was passed. The number of majorityblack and Hispanic congressional districts doubled, from 26 to 52, and this
resulted in a 50 % increase (from 26 to 39) in the number of black members of the
U.S. House of Representatives and a 38% increase (from 13 to 18) in the House
5
Hispanic caucus.

3.

Id. at 2828.

HAROLD W. STANLEY & RICHARD G. NIEMI, VITAL STATISTICS ON AMERICAN POLITICS 395-97
(1992).
5. U.S. Department of Commerce News, U.S. Bureau of the Census, Press Release, Number of
Congressional Districts with Black or Hispanic Majorities Doubles, Census Bureau Says, Revised, March 24,
1993; Black-and-Hispanic-Majority Districts, CQ WEEKLY REPORT, July 10, 1993. New majority-black
districts were created in Florida (3); Georgia, North Carolina, and Texas (2 each); Alabama, Louisiana,
Maryland, New York, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Virginia (I each); and new majority-Hispanic

4.
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Redistricting plans also were adopted that increased the number of majorityblack state legislative districts, resulting in a 23% increase (from 448 to 511) in
the number of black state legislators.' In the South, there was a 55.8% increase
(from 43 to 67) in the number of black state senators and a 34% increase (from
159 to 213) in the number of black state representatives.7 The most dramatic
increases in black representation in state legislatures occurred in Mississippi,
where black representation almost doubled (from 22 to 42), and Louisiana, where
the number of black legislators increased 60% (from 19 to 31).G Nonetheless,
despite these gains, the growth in minority representation in Congress and state
legislatures did not exceed the minority population percentages in these states and
still fell short of providing proportional representation for minorities.
State legislatures in seven states drew new majority-black and Hispanic
congressional districts, and federal and state courts created them in seven other
states. State legislatures adopted minority districts primarily to avoid
discrimination; to comply with Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, as construed by
the Supreme Court in Thornburg v. Gingles;9 and to avoid Justice Department
objections under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, or, if an objection was
lodged, to remedy the Justice Department objection."0
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, as amended by Congress in 1982 to obviate
the necessity of proving discriminatory intent in voting rights cases, prohibits any
voting practice, including redistricting plans, that has discriminatory "results.""1
districts were added in California (5); Texas (2); Arizona. Florida. Illinois. and New York (I each). Id.
6. JOINT CENTER FOR POLITICAL AND EcoNoMic STUDIES. BLAcK ELEcrw OFFICIALS: A NATIONAL
ROSTER, table 3, xxii-xxiii (1991); JOINT CENTER FOR POLITICAL AND EcoNOtic STUDIES, BLACK ELEcTE
OFFICIALS: A NATIONAL ROSTER, tables 6 and 7. xxvii-xxviii (1993).
7. DAVID BosITs, JOINT CENTER FOR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC STUDIES. REDISTRICTING AND
REPRESENTATION: THE CREATION OF MAJORITY-MINORITY DISTRICTS AND THE EVOLVING PARTY Sk^STEI IN
THE SOUTH 46 (1995).

8. Id.
9. 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
10. Under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c, coered States and political
subdivisions are required to submit any changes in their voting laws, including new redistricting plans, for
preclearance (in the form of a request for declaratory judgment) to the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia, or alternatively, to the United States Attorney General. The submitting jurisdiction has
the burden of proving that the voting law change is not racially discriminatory in purpose or effect. If the
district court denies preclearance, or if the Justice Department objects to the change, the jurisdiction is
prohibited from implementing the voting law change. See Georgia v. United States. 411 U.S. 526, 529-36
(1973).
11. 42 U.S.C. 1973. For analyses of congressional passage of the amended Section 2 and subsequent
litigation, see QuIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH (Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman eds.. 1994);
Thomas M. Boyd & Stephen J. Markman, The 1982 Amendments to the Voting Rights Act. A Legislative
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In Gingles, the Court interpreted the statutory language and legislative history of
Section 2 to establish three "necessary preconditions" for proving unlawful
minority vote dilution:
First, the minority group must be able to demonstrate that it is sufficiently
large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member
district. . . .Second, the minority group must be able to show that it is
politically cohesive [i.e., that "a significant number of minority group
members usually vote for the same candidates"].... Third, the minority must
be able to demonstrate that the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to
2
enable it ... usually to defeat the minority's preferred candidate.1
Given these three elements of proof (the "Gingles factors"), state legislatures
logically could conclude that if factors 2 and 3 were present-racial bloc voting by
whites and blacks, and the usual defeat of minority-preferred candidates-then the
legislature's failure to create additional majority-minority districts, where such
districts could be drawn, could establish a Section 2 violation.
This interpretation was confirmed by a three-judge district court decision in one
of the first post-Gingles redistricting cases, Jeffers v. Clinton,5 which was
summarily affirmed by the Supreme Court. In Jeffers, black voters challenged the
Arkansas legislature's failure to create additional majority-black districts in
counties marked by racially polarized voting, and the district court found that the
State's failure to create additional majority-black districts violated Section 2 of the
14
Voting Rights Act.

History, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1347 (1983); Joan F. Hartman, Racial Vote Dilution and Separationof
Powers: An Exploration of the Conflict Between the Judicial "Intent" and the Legislative "Results"
Standards, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 689 (1982); Laughlin McDonald, The Quiet Revolution In Minority

Voting Rights, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1249 (1989); Frank R. Parker, The "'Results" Test of Section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act, 69 VA. L. Rav. 715 (1983).
12. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50-51.
13. 730 F. Supp. 196 (E.D. Ark. 1989), affd mem., 498 U.S. 1019 (1991).

14. The court held that if the challenged district lines "limit the number of majority-black singlemember districts," and "reasonably compact and contiguous majority-black districts could have been drawn,"
and if "racial cohesiveness in voting is so great that, as a practical matter, black voters' preferences for black
candidates are frustrated by this system of apportionment," then "the outlines of a Section 2 theory are made
out." Id. at 205.
The court in Jeffers did not apply a strict compactness standard, id. at 207, and most courts prior to
Shaw v. Reno ruled that lack of geographical compactness of the proposed majority-minority districts did not
defeat proving Gingles factor one. See Dillard v. Baldwin County Comm'n, 694 F. Supp. 836 (M.D. Ala.),
aff'd, 862 F.2d 878 (11 th Cir. 1988); Neal v. Coleburn, 689 F. Supp. 1426, 1435-36 (E.D. Va. 1988); Dillard
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After the 1990 Census, some state legislatures were unable to agree on new

congressional and state legislative redistricting plans, and federal and state courts
were required to adopt court-ordered plans. These courts generally held that even

in the absence of a judicial determination of a Section 2 violation, the Voting
Rights Act required the creation of new majority-minority districts where such
districts could be created or, even if they were not required, the creation of such
districts was consistent with the remedial provisions of the Voting Rights Act. 0
Further, the Justice Department objected under Section 5 of the Voting Rights
Act to new congressional redistricting plans in Alabama, Georgia, and North
Carolina, and to new state legislative redistricting plans in ten other states.10 The
Justice Department Section 5 objection letters indicate that the Department
objected to these plans on several grounds: the proposed district lines fragmented
or overconcentrated minority voting strength; the plans protected white incumbents
at the expense of creating additional majority-minority districts; the plans
v. Baldwin County Bd. of Educ., 686 F. Supp. 1459, 1465-66 (M.D. Ala. 1988).
15. Voting Rights Act requires creation of majority-minoriy districts if there is racialbloc voting and
minority districts can be drawn: Wilson v. Eu, 823 P.2d 545. 550 (Cal. 1992) (creating five new majorityHispanic congressional districts) (court-appointed masters attempted "to draw voting district lines in such a
manner as to maximize the opportunities for meaningful minority participation in California elections");
Mellow v. Mitchell, 607 A.2d 204, 219 (Pa.) (creating one new majority-black congressional district) ("When
possible, an increase in the number of minority-in-the-majority districts is constitutionally [sic] required.")
(court-appointed master's report), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 88 (1992); De Grandy v. Wetherell. 794 F. Supp.
1076, 1085 (N.D. Fla. 1992) (creating three new majority-black and one new majority-Hispanic congressional
districts) (agreeing with special master's report that "the law supports the drawing of a minority district
where, in light of minority concentrations and community of interests, such a district can reasonably be
drawn"); Hastert v. State Bd. of Elections, 777 F. Supp. 634, 648-51 (N.D. II. 1991) (creating one new
majority-Hispanic congressional district) (proof of Gingles factors and past history of discrimination "satisfies
this court that a Hispanic majority district is warranted under Gingles"). Id. at 651.
Creation of additional minority districts consistent with the Voting Rights Act: Arizonans for Fair
Representation v. Symington, 828 F. Supp. 684, 689 (D. Ariz. 1992) (creating one new majority-Hispanic
district) (adoption of new majority-Hispanic district "comports with the requirements of the Voting Rights
Act"), affd mem. sub nom. Hispanic Chamber of Commerce v. Arizonans for Fair Representation. 113 S. Ct.
1573 (1993); Burton v. Sheheen, 793 F. Supp. 1329, 1350 (D.S.C. 1992) (creating one new majority-black
congressional district) ("It would be incongruous for the court to adopt a plan which did not comport with the
standards and guidelines of § 2."), but see id. at 1365 ("there is no duty to maximize the number of black
majority districts in the state or insure proportional representation on the basis of race"), vacated and
remanded on other grounds, 113 S. Ct. 2954 (1993); Wesch v. Hunt, 785 F. Supp. 1491. 1499 (S.D. Ala.)
(creating one new majority-black congressional district) (parties' stipulation that a 65% or more black district
should be created avoids court determining whether Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act requires creation of
such district), afd sub nom. Camp v. Wesch, 504 US. 902 (1992). Figures v. Hunt. 113 S. Ct. 1233 (1993).
16. Frank R. Parker, Voting Rights Enforcement in the Bush Administration: The Four-Year Record,
in REPORT OF THE CITIZENS COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, NEW OPPORTNITIES: CIVIL RIGHiTS AT A

CROSSROADS 117 (Susan M. Liss & William L. Taylor eds., 1993) [hereinafter Voting Rights Enforcement.
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unnecessarily limited the number of majority-minority districts, especially when
alternative plans were available that showed additional majority-minority districts
could be created; and the State officials did not adequately justify their failure to
create additional majority-minority districts, suggesting discriminatory intent. 17
These Justice Department Section 5 objections required state legislatures to create
additional majority-minority districts to obtain Justice Department preclearance of
their redistricting plans.
The striking increase in the number of majority-black and Hispanic districts
triggered a white backlash that focused on the use of race in drawing majorityminority districts and on the shapes of some of the districts. Offended white voters
filed federal court lawsuits in seven states: California, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana,
Mississippi, North Carolina, and Texas, alleging that the creation of majorityminority congressional districts violates the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.18

H. THE SHAW v. RENO DECISION

The first such lawsuit to reach the Supreme Court was the North Carolina case
of Shaw v. Reno.'9 Prior to redistricting in 1991-92, North Carolina, which is

17. See id. at 117-18.
18. After the Supreme Court's decision in Shaw, district courts in Louisiana, Georgia, and Texas held
five newly-created majority-minority districts unconstitutional. Hays v. Louisiana, 839 F. Supp. 1188 (W.D.
La. 1993), vacatedand remanded, 114 S. Ct. 2731 (1994), 862 F. Supp. 119 (W.D. La.) (three-judge court),
prob. juris. noted, 115 S. Ct. 687 (1994); Johnson v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. 1354 (S.D. Ga.) (three-judge
court), prob. juris. noted, 115 S. Ct. 713 (1994); Vera v. Richards, 861 F. Supp. 1304 (S.D. Tex. 1994)
(three-judge court), juris. statement filed, 63 U.S.L.W. 3388 (U.S. Oct. 31, 1994) (No. 94-805). District
courts in North Carolina and California applied Shaw and sustained the constitutionality of minority districts.
Shaw v. Hunt, 861 F. Supp. 408 (E.D.N.C. 1994) (three-judge court), juris. statement filed, 63 U.S.L.W.
3439 (U.S. Nov. 21, 1994) (No. 94-923); DeWitt v. Wilson, 856 F. Supp. 1409 (E.D. Cal. 1994) (three-judge
court), juris. statement filed, 63 U.S.L.W. 3127 (U.S. Aug. 8, 1994) (No. 94-275).
19.
113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993). For further analyses of the Supreme Court's decision, see T. Alexander
Aleinikoff & Samuel Issacharoff, Race and Redistricting:Drawing Constitutional Lines After Shaw v. Reno,
92 MICH. L. REv. 588 (1993); A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. etal., Shaw v. Reno: A Mirage of Good Intentions
with Devastating Racial Consequences, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 1593 (1994); David Kairys, Race Trilogy, 67
TEMP. L. REV. 1 (1994); Pamela S. Karlan, All Over the Map: The Supreme Court's Voting Rights Trilogy,
1993 Sup. CT. REV. 245 [hereinafter Karlan, All Over the Map]; Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi,
Expressive Harms, "Bizarre Districts," and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After
Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 483 (1993); Daniel D. Polsby & Robert D. Popper, Ugly: An Inquiry Into
the Problem of Racial GerrymanderingUnder the Voting Rights Act, 92 MICH.L. REV. 652 (1993); Anthony
Q. Fletcher, Recent Development, White Lines, Black Districts--Shaw v. Reno and the Dilution of the Anti-
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20% black in voting age population, had not had a black member of Congress
since 1901, and since passage of the Voting Rights Act in 1965, all the state's
congressional districts had been majority-white. The state legislature in 1991
adopted a statewide congressional redistricting plan that created the state's first
recent majority-black congressional district, located in the northeastern part of the
state. But when state officials submitted the plan to the Justice Department for
preclearance, as required by Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, the Justice
Department lodged a Section 5 objection to the plan because the legislature failed
to give effect to a second minority population concentration in the south-central
and southeastern portion of the state, and because the State's purported reasons
for not creating a second minority district were pretextual.2 ' In response to the
Justice Department's objection, the state legislature then drew a second majorityblack district in the central Piedmont area in the south-central to southeast section
of the state, and the Justice Department approved the second plan.2
Both majority-black districts were irregular in shape. The Wall Street Journal
reported that District I looked like a "bug splattered on a windshield."22 District
12 was a long, narrow district that proceeded in a thin band down Interstate
Highway 85 for 160 miles from Durham to beyond Charlotte. In the 1992
congressional elections, two black representatives, Eva Clayton and Melvin Watt,
were elected in both of the majority-black districts and became the first black
members of Congress from North Carolina since 1901.
Plaintiffs, who were five white voters from Durham County in the north-central
Piedmont region of the state, challenged this plan on Fourteenth Amendment and
other constitutional grounds. Plaintiffs asserted that the Fourteenth Amendment
and other constitutional provisions prohibit race-conscious redistricting. The
district court dismissed the white voters' lawsuit for failing to state a constitutional
claim,13 but the Supreme Court, by a narrow 5-to-4 majority in an opinion written

dilution Principle, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 231 (1994); Not.,The Supreme Court. 1992 Term. Leading
Cases, 107 HARV. L. Ray. 194 (1993).
20. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2820.
21. Id.
22. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2820 (quoting WALL ST J.,Feb. 4, 1992, at A14).
23. Shaw v. Barr, 808 F. Supp. 461 (E.D.N.C. 1992) (three-judge court), rev'd sub nom.Shaw v. Reno,
113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993). The district court dismissed plaintiffs' complaint on the basis of the Supreme Court's
prior decision in United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977). in which the Court rejected the
claim of Hasidic Jews in New York City that splitting up an Hasidic population concentration to create new
majority-black legislative districts to satisfy a Justice Department objection under § 5 of the Voting Rights
Act violated white voters' Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district court construed United Jemsh
Organizations to hold that the Fourteenth Amendment does not prohibit race-conscious redistricting to meet
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by Justice O'Connor, held that the white voters' complaint stated a Fourteenth
24
Amendment cause of action and sent the case back to the district court for trial.
The majority refused to accept plaintiffs' contention that all race-conscious
redistricting is unconstitutional.2 5 Instead, the Court held that plaintiffs may state
an equal protection claim by alleging that although a state's redistricting plan is
race-neutral on its face, the "extremely irregular" shapes of the districts
"rationally cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to separate
voters into different districts on the basis of race, and that the separation lacks
sufficient justification. 12 6 The Court decided that the highly irregular shapes of
challenged districts may make the plan a racial classification, trigger the strict
scrutiny standard of review, and require the State to show that the plan "is
narrowly tailored to further a compelling governmental interest." 27
The Supreme Court's decision raises a number of issues that the Court failed to
address, or addressed in an unsatisfactory manner and that remain to be resolved.
If white voters are not discriminated against (that is, they continue to have
proportional representation or even remain overrepresented) by a redistricting plan
that creates additional majority-minority districts, how can white voters be
personally injured in any constitutional sense by such a plan, or have legal
standing in court to challenge such a plan? If the crux of the Supreme Court's
decision is that only "unusually-shaped" or "bizarre" majority-minority districts
violate the Fourteenth Amendment, are there any reliable, judicially-manageable
standards by which courts can determine a violation? If the creation of highlyirregular minority districts triggers strict scrutiny because they raise an inference
of racial intent in devising a redistricting plan, does this mean that direct evidence
of racial intent also triggers strict scrutiny? To what extent does the Court's

the requirements of the Voting Rights Act, Shaw v. Barr, 808 F. Supp. 461, 470-72, (E.D.N.C. 1992), and
that there can be no equal protection violation in the absence of an allegation that the plan was adopted for
the purpose and effect of discriminating against white voters. Id. at 472-73.
24. After a trial the district court, applying the legal standards that the Supreme Court articulated in
Shaw, sustained the constitutionality of the challenged plan. Shaw v. Hunt, 861 F. Supp. 408 (E.D.N.C.
1994).
25. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2824. However, the Court expressly declined to express a view on whether "the
intentional creation of majority-minority districts, without more, always gives rise to an equal protection
claim," id. at 2828 (internal quotations omitted), suggesting that it might be reserving that question for a
future case.
26. Id. at 2824, 2828.
27. Id. at 2832. Justice White dissented, joined by Justices Blackmun and Stevens, Id. at 2834-43;
Justices Blackmun and Stevens also filed separate dissenting opinions, id. at 2843-45; Justice Souter dissented
separately, id. at 2845-49.
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decision bar voluntary compliance with the Voting Rights Act when a state
legislature (or court) concludes that the creation of additional majority-black or
Hispanic districts is necessary to comply with the Voting Rights Act? What
implications does the setting of new and difficult constitutional limitations on the
creation of majority-minority districts have for efforts to make the democratic
process more inclusive for minorities?
M

CONSTITUTIONAL INJURY AND STANDING

The Shaw decision, and the other minority redistricting cases, raise serious
issues of constitutional injury and standing because these cases lack elements
generally considered essential to an equal protection claim, namely, discrimination
against a protected and identifiable class and personal injury to the plaintiffs. Can
there be a justiciable equal protection claim if these elements are not present?
Shaw was a dramatic departure from prior cases because the white plaintiffs
filed this case, not as injured parties, but as spoilers, intent on eliminating the new
majority-black districts as a matter of principle. The white voter plaintiffs made no
claim that they represented white voters. Nor did they claim that the challenged
redistricting plan unfairly diluted white voting strength, discriminated against
white voters, or violated the rights of innocent white victims of a racial
preference,28 nor could any such claim legitimately have been made. Although
three of the five white plaintiffs who previously had been in a majority-white
district were placed in a new majority-black district under the plan, this does not
constitute a denial of equal protection. The Court specifically held in United
Jewish Organizationsv. Carey2 ---a decision the Supreme Court distinguished but

did not overrule in Shaw-that so long as whites as a group have fair
representation, no individual white voter has a constitutional right to live in a
district in which his or her race is in the majority."0 Nor, as Justice White pointed
out in his dissent, were whites as a group discriminated against in Shaw. Whites,

28. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2824.
29. 430 U.S. 144 (1977) (plurality opinion).
30. Id. at 166. This has to be the law, because in any redistricting plan with white and majorityminority districts, some whites will be placed in minority districts and some minorities in Ahite districts. If
these voters could claim an equal protection violation solely by virtue of the fact that members of their race
constitute less than 50% of their districts, no redistricting plan would ever be valid because any plan.
regardless of how racially fair, would be vulnerable to challenges by voters transferred from districts in which
their race is in the majority to ones in which it is in the minority.
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who made up 79 % of North Carolina's voting age population, remained slightly
overrepresented with voting majorities in 83% (10 of 12) of the congressional
districts.3'
Minority redistricting cases such as Shaw are distinguishable from the
affirmative action cases in which white plaintiffs successfully challenged racial
preferences. In Regents of the University of Californiav. Bakke8a the Court's first
affirmative action decision, Bakke was personally injured when he was denied the
opportunity to compete for all 100 places in his medical school class because slots
were set aside for minority applicants who, Bakke alleged, had lower grade point
averages and test scores than he did. 33 In City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,31
the minority business set-aside case, white contractors were harmed because they
were denied the opportunity to compete for a fixed percentage of municipal
contracts because of their race. In Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,5 the
teacher layoff case, white teachers with greater seniority were directly harmed
because they were laid off while minority teachers with less seniority were
retained.
In each of these cases, there was arguably some reasonable expectation or
independent claim of entitlement by whites-higher test scores, acceptable bids on
contracts, greater seniority-that was negated by the challenged racial preference
for minorities. But in the Shaw-type cases, there is no independent claim of
entitlement on the part of white voters to live in a particular congressional district
or to be overrepresented in the congressional delegation that is violated by the
creation of majority-minority districts.
The absence of any cognizable claim of discrimination against the white voter
plaintiffs or whites in general in Shaw goes directly to the question whether
plaintiffs in cases challenging new minority districts have standing to litigate their
claims, an issue which none of the Justices addressed in the Shaw v. Reno
opinion.36 Under what the Court describes as "a long line of cases," standing is
31. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2838. Nor could plaintiffs claim a deprivation by the fact that the number of
majority-white districts was reduced. The plaintiffs did not claim to represent a class of white voters who wero
discriminated against under the challenged plan. Id. Further, the Supreme Court has ruled in Voting Rights
Act cases brought by minority voters that generally there is no unlawful vote dilution if the plaintiff group has
proportional representation. Johnson v. De Grandy, 114 S. Ct. 2647, 2657-62 (1994); Thornburg v. Gingles,
478 U.S. 30, 80 (1986).
32. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
33. Id. at 277 (opinion of Powell, J.).
34. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
35. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
36. None of the parties to the appeal addressed the standing issue because, in noting probable
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necessary to meet the "case-or-controversy"

requirement of Article III and

requires that plaintiff show (1) an "injury-in-fact" that is personal, concrete,
particularized, and imminent; (2) a causal connection between the injury and the
conduct complained of; and (3) a likelihood that the injury will be redressed by a
favorable decision. 7
A.

Injury-in-Fact
For at least the past 20 years, the Supreme Court consistently has adhered to a

strict interpretation of the injury-in-fact requirement that bars citizen-action
lawsuits to redress abstract, generalized grievances common to all members of the
public, in the absence of personal, particularized, and concrete harm to the
plaintiffs.as Further, in the most significant prior case involving a constitutional

jurisdiction, the Court expressly directed the parties to limit their briefs and argument to the question whether
the legislature's intent to comply with the Voting Rights Act precluded a finding that the legislature adopted
the plan with a discriminatory intent. Shaw v. Barr, 113 S. Ct. 653 (1992). See Karlan. All Ov'er The Map,
supra note 19, at 277. However, even if the parties did not raise the standing issue, the Court itself has an

independent responsibility to raise questions concerning its Article Ill jurisdiction. Bender v. Williamsport
Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534 (1986).
37. Northeastern Florida Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors v. City of Jacksonville, 113 S. CL
2297, 2301-02 (1993); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 505 U.S. 555 (1992); Simon v. Eastern Kentucky
Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38, 41-43 (1976); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490. 508 (1975).
38. See United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 176-77 (1974) (federal taxpayer has no standing to
challenge the federal government's failure to publish the Central Intelligence Agency's budget as a violation of
the Statement and Accounts Clause (Art. I, § 9, c. 7); plaintiffs' claim was merely a "generalized grievance"
that was "plainly undifferentiated and common to all members of the public," and although plaintiff as a
taxpayer "has a genuine interest in the use of funds," nonetheless he is not "in danger of suffering any
particular concrete injury as a result of the operation of this statute."); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to
Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 223 n.13 (1974) (citizens lack standing to raise challenge that allowing members
of Congress to retain their commissions in the military reserve violated the Incompatibility Clause (Art. 1,
§ 6); plaintiffs alleged nothing but "the abstract injury in nonobservance of the Constitution."); Valley Forge
Christian College v. Americans United for the Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 483
(1982) (citizens and taxpayers denied standing to challenge a government donation of surplus prope-rty to a
sectarian school as a violation of the Establishment Clause, the Court holding that "assertion of a right to a
particular kind of Government conduct... cannot alone satisfy the requirements of Art. Ill without draining
those requirements of meaning."); and Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737. 754 (1984) (parents of black
schoolchildren attending public schools denied standing to challenge IRS administrative practices granting tax
exempt status to segregated private schools, the Court holding in part that "[tihis court has repeatedly held
that an asserted right to have the Government act in accordance with [the] law is not sufficient, standing
alone, to confer jurisdiction on a federal court."). See also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555
(1992) (wildlife conservation and environmental organizations denied standing to litigate violations of the
Endangered Species Act); Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976) (welfare
rights group and poor persons refused hospital service denied standing to litigate denials of hospital service
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challenge to the creation of majority-minority districts, United Jewish
Organizations v. Carey,3 9 five members of the Court held that there was no
constitutional violation without proof of unequal treatment, and the absence of any
showing that race was used to discriminate against whites or dilute white voting
40
strength defeated the plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment claim.
If it is not discrimination against whites or dilution of white voting strength,
what is the judicially-cognizable constitutional injury that sustains the Shaw v.
Reno cause of action? The majority believed that redistricting by race "bears an
uncomfortable resemblance to political apartheid," produces stigmatic injury by
reinforcing racial stereotypes, and "reinforces the perception that members of the
same racial group ...think alike, share the same political interests, and will prefer
the same candidates at the polls."'41 Further, the majority determined that the
creation of minority districts, by perpetuating such notions, "may exacerbate the
very patterns of racial bloc voting that majority-minority districting is sometimes
said to counteract.'4 The majority also thought that "[w]hen a district obviously
is created solely to effectuate the perceived common interests of one racial group,
elected officials are more likely to believe that their primary obligation is to
represent only the members of that group, rather than their constituency as a
whole."4a

that allegedly violated Internal Revenue Code); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (low income persons,
taxpayers, fair housing group, and home builders denied standing to challenge municipality's exclusionary
zoning policy as violation of Fourteenth Amendment rights).
39. 430 U.S. 144 (1977).
40. Id. at 165-67 (White, J.,
joined by Stevens and Rehnquist, JJ.);
id. at 179-80 (Stewart, J.,
joined by
Powell, J.).
41. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2827.
42. Id.
43. Id. The Court omitted any direct reference to the race of persons it believed were injured, implying
that the damage was equally shared by whites and blacks (and other minorities). The notion that racial
redistricting is demeaning to whites contradicts the views of three members of the majority in United Jewish
Organizations that racial redistricting is constitutionally permissible because it represents "no racial slur or
stigma with respect to whites or any other race." United Jewish Organizations, 430 U.S. at 165 (White, .,
joined by Stevens and Rehnquist, JJ.).
It is difficult to imagine how the creation of majority-minority districts
demeans whites. One possible reading of the Shaw decision is that the Court was primarily concerned with
perpetuating the perception that all black people (or all minorities) "think alike, share the same political
interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the polls." Cf. STEPHEN L. CARTER, REFLECTIONS OF AN
AFFIRMATIvE ACTION BABY 29-34, 53-54, 93, 209-11 (1991).

If this interpretation is correct, then under the Court's traditional standing doctrine it is difficult in the
redistricting context to see how white voters, who are opposed to the creation of majority-minority districts,
would have third-party standing to challenge stigmatic injury to minority voters, who are likely to support the
creation of majority-black districts as a way of gaining representation of their choice, because of the conflict of

SHAW V. RENO

On their face, these assertions of injury fail to meet the strict standards the
Court has established in the Richardson/Schlesinger/ValleyForge line of cases
because they describe only abstract societal harms common to all members of the
public," and not any distinct, concrete personal deprivation suffered by any of the
plaintiffs. Further, the first injury, the stigma produced by the reinforcement of
impermissible racial stereotypes, was specifically rejected as sufficient by the Court
in Allen v. Wright.45 In Allen, parents of black public schoolchildren challenged
what they alleged to be the Internal Revenue Service's lax enforcement of its
policies denying tax exempt status to segregated private schools that, they
contended, resulted in some segregated schools continuing to receive federal tax
benefits. Justice O'Connor, writing for the Court, separated this claim of injury
into two elements: (1) a claim simply to redress a constitutional and statutory
violation and make the government obey the law; and (2) a claim of "stigmatic
injury, or denigration, suffered by all members of a racial group when the
Government discriminates on the basis of race.' 0 "Under neither interpretation,"
7
Justice O'Connor concluded, "is this claim of injury judicially cognizable."'"
Plaintiffs' complaint in Shaw that the Constitution is color-blind and that any
race-conscious redistricting is unconstitutional perfectly fits the first element of
plaintiffs' claim in Allen; it was nothing more than an effort to establish a
constitutional principle of colorblindness in redistricting. As to the second element
of the claim in Allen, the Court conceded that stigmatic injury is a serious
consequence of discriminatory governmental action, but ruled that established
precedent dictated "that such injury accords a basis for standing only to 'those
persons who are personally denied equal treatment' by the challenged
discriminatory conduct."481 Allowing standing for abstract stigmatic injury, the
Court thought, would "transform the federal courts into 'no more than a vehicle

interests and the absence of any impediment to minorities bringing their own lawsuits to protect their rights.
See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614. 621-30 (1991) (criteria for third-party standing); cf.
Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953) (rule against third-party standing outweighed by need to protect
fundamental rights).
44. Justice O'Connor herself described them as posing "the risk
of lasting harm to our society." Shaw.
113 S. Ct. at 2832.
45. 468 U.S. 737 (1984). See also supra note 38.
46. Allen, 468 U.S. at 754 (footnote omitted).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 755 (quoting Heckler v. Matthews, 465 U.S. 728. 739-40 (1984)). Although the Court cited
Heckler for the notion that stigma "issufficient in some circumstances to support standing" id., the Court
explained Heckler as supporting the principle that stigmatic injury grants standing only "tothe extent that
respondents are personally subject to discriminatory treatment." Id. at 757 n.22.
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for the vindication of the value interests of concerned bystanders,'" exceeding
"[c]onstitutional limits on the role of. . . federal courts." 9 Allen's direct holding
is that the injury-in-fact requirement bars standing to litigate stigmatic injury
alone, but the case has a broader meaning as well. Because the Court assumed for
purposes of its decision that the challenged tax exemptions were the equivalent of
government discrimination (i.e., a government-supported racial classification), 0
the Allen holding also denies standing to "concerned bystanders" attempting to
challenge racial classifications under which they are not personally subjected to
discriminatory treatment. Justice O'Connor makes this explicit in a footnote in
which she states that unless the Court observes a strict injury-in-fact requirement,
the result might be such undesirable and unthinkable consequences as "recognition
of respondents' standing to challenge [every] execution ... [as] cruel and unusual
punishment, or . . . every affirmative-actionprogram on the basis of a personal

right to a government that does not deny equal protection of the laws .... "5 1
The Supreme Court's decision in Shaw allowing white voters to challenge
minority redistricting contradicts firmly established constitutional jurisprudence on
standing and injury-in-fact and is irreconcilable with Allen and related cases. 2
Alexander Aleinikoff and Samuel Issacharoff attempt to rationalize this
inconsistency by arguing that, against the current trend of narrow interpretation of
the injury-in-fact requirement, the Court in Northeastern Florida Chapter of
Associated General Contractors v. City of Jacksonville" significantly eased the
injury-in-fact requirement in cases challenging racial classifications by exempting
plaintiffs from the burden of proving direct and personal injury.5 ' The Court
sustained the standing of white contractors to challenge the city's set-aside
program even though none of the contractors had submitted a bid or been turned
down for a city contract.
But that case, while allowing an attentuated showing of injury, continued to
require an independent showing of unequal treatment to maintain an equal
protection claim. The Court held that the minority set-aside program posed a
barrier to white contractors' ability to compete for city contracts, and that this
49. Allen, 468 U.S. at 756 (quoting United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency
Procedures, 412 U.S. 669, 687 (1973)).
50. Id. at 754 n.20.
51. Id. at 756 n.21 (quoting Valley Forge Christian College, 454 U.S. at 489-90 n.26 (1982))
(emphasis added).
52. See Karlan, All Over the Map, supra note 19, at 279-80 (standing in Shaw inconsistent with Allen).
53. 113 S. Ct. 2297 (1993) (minority business set-aside case).
54. Aleinikoff & Issacharoff, supra note 19, at 642.
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form of unequal treatment was sufficient to constitute injury-in-fact for Article III
standing: "The 'injury in fact' in an equal protection case of this variety is the
denial of equal treatment resulting from the imposition of the barrier, not the
ultimate inability to obtain the benefit." 55 The injury which gave the plaintiffs
standing was not any generalized stigmatic injury from any racial stereotype or the
general societal harm produced by a racial classification, but a more concrete
"inability to compete on an equal footing in the bidding process.""" Thus,
Northeastern Florida Contractors cannot be used to explain the Shaw decision,
because the Court in that case still required a showing of unequal treatment 7 that
was entirely absent in Shaw v. Reno.58
If the Court seeks to loosen the strict standing requirements under which it has
denied standing to minorities challenging governmental support for racial
discrimination, environmental groups contesting violations of federal wildlife
protection statutes, and citizens/taxpayers seeking to enforce adherence to other
constitutional requirements; dispense with the injury-in-fact requirement; and
allow citizens without personal injury carte blanche to challenge governmental
racial classifications, then the Court has an obligation to state directly what it is
doing and why. The Court would then have to explain why repealing the injury-infact requirement is constitutional in light of its prior holdings that it is
constitutionally required by the Article III "case or controversy" limitation. The
Court would also have to explain why racial classification claims brought by white
plaintiffs are more preferred, and why the need to broaden standing in the absence
of any specific harm is more compelling for whites than liberalizing standing
requirements in other categories of cases in which plaintiffs have alleged creditable
claims of injury, but in which standing was denied.
Apart from the issue whether the Court's claims concerning harms caused by
minority redistricting on their face satisfy the traditional standing criteria, there is
also the empirical question whether racial redistricting, in fact, causes any of the
racial stereotyping or societal harm that the Court attributes to it. The issue arises
against the backdrop of United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, in which seven

55. Northeastern Florida Contractors, 113 S. Ct. at 2303.
56. Id.
57. See Note, supra note 19, at 202 n.66.
58. Unlike minority set-asides, majority-minority districts. like those created in Shaw. do not prevent
whites from competing for elective office because of their race. Whites and minonties remain free to run in
those districts and to compete for votes. The likelihood that. given racial bloc voting, black candidates may
have a better chance of getting elected does not mean that white candidates are denied the same opportunity
to compete for votes.
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Justices concluded that race-conscious redistricting is not constitutionally harmful
per se,5 9 and three Justices specifically concluded that the use of race in
redistricting by itself is not injurious because it represents "no racial slur or stigma
with respect to whites or any other race."' 60 The Shaw Court's efforts to distinguish
United Jewish Organizations is unpersuasive on this issue, 61 and the Court failed
to demonstrate why the United Jewish Organizationsmajority was wrong, or what
new evidence has been produced that demonstrated that the views of the three

Justices who found that racial redistricting was not stigmatizing were erroneous.
The Court's assertion that racial redistricting reinforces an impermissible racial
stereotype of racial differences in voting behavior, giving rise to a constitutional
injury, is difficult to sustain. Racially polarized voting behavior" is, as Justice
White has said, "a fact of life," 6S-and there is abundant evidence that it is
widespread, especially in the South. The most recent study of the impact of the
Voting Rights Act in the South shows that racial voting, especially by whites, is
0
pervasive, and few black candidates can win election in majority-white districts. 4
In the face of this evidence, it is difficult to see how racial redistricting can cause
additional harm by "reinforcing the perception" of something that already exists;
or, that simply recognizing its existence-where it does in fact exist--constitutes a

59. United Jewish Organizations, 430 U.S. at 147-68 (White, J.,joined by Stevens, Brennan,
Blackmun, and Rehnquist, JJ.);
id. at 179-80 (Stewart, J.,
joined by Powell, J.).
60. Id. at 165 (White, J., joined by Stevens and Rehnquist, JJ.).
61. Justice O'Connor attempted to distinguish United Jewish Organizationsas a case in which plaintiffs
did not allege that the districts were "so highly irregular that [they] rationally could be understood only as an
effort to segregate voters by race," and contended that the presence of this claim in Shaw made it
"'analytically distinct" from the vote dilution claim made in United Jewish Organizations.Shaw, 113 S.Ct. at
2829-30.
However, the injury-causing factor to which the majority pointed is the use of race in redistricting-"an
effort to classify and separate voters by race," id. at 2828, which was implied from the irregular shape of the
districts. The shapes of the districts, therefore, were only relevant as an indicator of the use of race. This
eliminates any distinction between United Jewish Organizationsand Shaw because in both cases the principal
thrust of the plaintiffs' complaints was that the use of race violated the Fourteenth Amendment. In his dissent,
Justice White disparaged any distinction between the two cases by accusing the majority of "glossing over the
striking similarities, focusing on surface differences, most notably the (admittedly unusual) shape of the newly
created district, and imagining an entirely new cause of action." Id. at 2834.
62. In Gingles, 478 U.S. at 53 n.21, the Court ruled that racially polarized voting exists "where there is
.a consistent relationship between [the] race of the voter and the way in which the voter votes,' or to put it
differently, where 'black voters and white voters vote differently.'" (citations omitted).
63. Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 144 (1976) (White, J., dissenting).
64.

QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH: THE IMPACT OF THE VOTING

RIGHTS

ACT

1965-1990

(Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman eds., 1994). See also James W. Loewen, Racial Bloc Voting and
Political Mobilization in South Carolina, 19 REV. OF BLAcK POL. ECoNoMY 503 (1990).
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racial stereotype or is unfairly demeaning to whites or minorities. If statistical
analysis of election returns shows a significant correlation between race and voting
for the same candidates at the polls,6 5 this is statistical proof of racially polarized
voting behavior, not racial stereotyping.
The Shaw majority's view is strikingly at odds with Congress's determination in
amending the Voting Rights Act in 1982, and with the Court's own treatment of
racial voting in other cases before and after Shawoa that racial bloc voting-far
from being considered "an impermissible racial stereotype" 67-is a principal cause
of unlawful dilution of minority voting strength in majority-white districts. In
amending the Voting Rights Act in 1982 to establish the elements of a minority
vote dilution claim, Congress identified "the extent to which voting in the elections
of the state or political subdivision is racially polarized" as a leading evidentiary
factor for proving a Section 2 violation. 8 The Court itself in Thornburg v. Gingles
emphasized that racial bloc voting is a "key element" of any minority vote dilution
claim 69 and that the most important evidentiary factors bearing on Section 2 vote
dilution challenges are "the extent to which minority group members have been
elected to public office in the jurisdiction" and the "extent to which voting in the
elections of the state or political subdivision is racially polarized.17 0 In decisions
handed down both before and after the Shaw decision, the Court has consistently
adhered to its holding in Gingles that proof of racially polarized voting is an
essential element of a Section 2 minority vote dilution claim. 71 There is no
suggestion in the legislative history of the Voting Rights Act or other Supreme
Court decisions that focusing on racially polarized voting to show that minorities
have been denied an equal opportunity to elect their preferred candidates to office
is improper or unfairly demeaning.
Where racial bloc voting exists, majority-minority districts are necessary to
overcome white opposition to the election of minority candidates and to give
minority voters an equal opportunity to elect candidates of their choice. By
labelling the perception of racially polarized voting an impermissible racial
stereotype, the effect of the Court's ruling is to divert attention from what

65. See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 52-74.
66. Voinovich v. Quilter, 113 S. Ct. 1149 (1993); Growev. Emison, 113 S. Ct. 1075 (1993); Thornburg
v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
67. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2827.

68. S. REP. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1982). reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 206.
69. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 55, 48-51.
70. Id. at 48 n.15.
71.

Johnson, 114 S. Ct. at 2654-55; Voinovich, 113 S. Ct. at 1155-58; Growe, 113 S. Ct. at 108485.
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Congress and the Court itself in other decisions have identified as the principal
barrier to equal minority political participation that, where it exists, justifies
remedial action. Racial redistricting itself does not reinforce any improper
perception of racial voting behavior. Rather, racial bloc voting is the necessary
factual predicate for the creation of majority-minority districts. In redistricting by
a state legislature (or a court) outside the context of Section 2 litigation, majorityminority districts are necessary only where minority-preferred candidates regularly
have been defeated by white bloc voting.
B.

Causation and Redressability

In addition to injury-in-fact, the Court's standing decisions also require
causation and redressability, both of which are also essential to Article III
justiciability.72 Plaintiffs must show a causal relationship between the injury and
the challenged conduct-that "the injury 'fairly can be traced to the challenged
action of the defendant,' and has not resulted 'from the independent action of some
third party not before the court.' ,,7s The Court generally has insisted that the
chain of causation be direct and evident and has rejected standing when the nexus
between the challenged action and the claimed injury was "attenuated,"
"indirect," or "speculative. 17 4 Redressability requires "a likelihood that the injury
will be redressed by a favorable decision," and that the "'prospect of obtaining
relief from the injury as a result of a favorable ruling' is not 'too speculative.' ,,71
The Court's assertions that racial redistricting "may exacerbate the very
patterns of racial bloc voting that majority-minority districting is sometimes said
to counteract" and that "elected officials are more likely to believe that their
primary obligation is to represent only the members of that group, rather than
their constituency as a whole" 78 raise serious questions of causation and
redressability. In both cases, these alleged injuries are directly caused by third
parties not before the Court-voters who vote along racial lines and elected
officials who may decide to represent only members of one race. Under such
circumstances, when plaintiffs complain of governmental action which allegedly
72. See supra text accompanying note 37.
73. NortheasternFloridaContractors, 113 S. Ct. at 2302 (quoting Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare
Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-42 (1976)).
74. Allen, 468 U.S. at 757-59; Simon, 426 U.S. at 42; Warth, 422 U.S. at 505.
75. Northeastern Florida Contractors, 113 S. Ct. at 2302 (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752
(1984)).
76.

Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2827.
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has influenced independent third parties to inflict the injury complained of, the
Court generally has found that the causal link is too speculative and that the
alleged injury is not redressable by judicial decree. Thus, in Allen v. Wright, the
Court found that plaintiffs' second claim of injury-that IRS actions granting
federal tax benefits to segregated private schools interfered with public school
desegregation-was a cognizable injury. But the Court determined that there was
no causation or redressability because the injury was indirect and resulted from
the independent action of third parties-the segregated private schools-whose
effect on public school desegregation was conjectural. "[W]hether withdrawal of a
tax exemption from any particular school would lead the school to change its

policies" was "entirely speculative.""7
The effect of racial redistricting on racial bloc voting and the quality of

representation provided by elected officials is entirely speculative. The Supreme
Court failed to cite any evidence that racial redistricting causes racially polarized
voting, increases racial bloc voting, or encourages elected officials to represent only
members of their own race, and no such evidence exists. 78 In fact, the Court's own
prior decisions demonstrate that there are high levels of racial voting even in the
absence of majority-minority districts. For example, in Thornburg v. Gingles the
Court upheld district court findings of "severe and persistent racially polarized
voting" in North Carolina legislative elections even before majority-black single9
member legislative districts were created.7
Not only is there no evidence that racial redistricting exacerbates racial voting,
there is evidence that racial redistricting actually may mitigate racial bloc voting.
Mike Espy, the first black member of Congress from Mississippi in this century,
got only 12% of the white vote when he was elected in 1986 from a majority-black
Mississippi Delta district.8 0 But after 1986, white bloc voting against Espy
substantially decreased, and in subsequent elections Espy was reelected with much
higher white vote percentages and even white majorities.8 " Contrary to Justice
O'Connor's view, this suggests that the creation of majority-minority districts and
the subsequent election of minority candidates reduces white fear and harmful
stereotyping of minority candidates, ameliorates the racial balkanization of

77. Allen, 468 U.S. at 757-58. See also Lujan, 505 U.S. at 567-72.
78.

BERNARD GROFMAN ET AL, MINORITY REPRESENTATION AND THE QUEST FOR VOTING EQUALITY

132 (1992).
79. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 41.
80.

FRANK R. PARKER, BLACK VOTES COUNT.POLITICAL EMPOWERMENT IN MISSIssPPI AFTER 1965 at

140 (1990).
81.

JOHN DITTMER, LOCAL PEOPLE: THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGrT

IN MISSISSPPI 426 (1994).
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American society, and promotes a political system in which race does not matter
as much as it did before.
The Court's presumption that racial redistricting may affect the quality of
representation provided by elected officials is directly contrary to the Court's prior
decisions. In past cases the Court specifically has rejected any assumption that the
responsiveness of elected officials to any part of their constituency is determined by
the racial or political composition of their districts or how those districts are
drawn. The Court consistently has held that whether elected officials are
representing all their constituents, or only the racial or political majority which
elected them, is a matter for proof, not assumptions or speculation. In Davis v.
Bandemer8" the Court, in rejecting plaintiffs' claim that lack of proportional party
representation alone is sufficient to establish a political gerrymandering claim,
reiterated the presumption the Court also applied in the racial vote dilution cases
that "[a]n individual or a group of individuals who votes for a losing candidate is
usually deemed to be adequately represented by the winning candidate." 08
Contrary to the presumption made in Shaw, the Court was unwilling to presume
"without actual proof to the contrary, that the candidate elected will entirely
ignore the interests of those voters.""'
Because causation and redressability are frequently related, lack of causation
also suggests that redressability also is absent. There is nothing in the Shaw
Court's opinion to suggest how the injuries it identified are redressable by the
relief the plaintiffs were requesting. Banning irregularly-shaped minority districts

82. 478 U.S. 109 (1986) (plurality opinion).
83. Id. at 132.
84. Id. See also Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982) (black plaintiffs have the burden of proving
white elected officials were unresponsive to minority voters' needs; relevant as a factor in establishing
unconstitutionality of at-large elections); Dallas County v. Reese, 421 U.S. 477, 479-80 (1975) (countywide
elected officials must be "vigilant to serve the interests of all the people in the county, and not merely those of
people in his home district"); White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 765-66 (1973) (minority plaintiffs have burden
of proving unresponsiveness to minority interests); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 160 (1971) (mere lack
of proportional representation not sufficient for minority vote dilution claim; if white elected officials are
unresponsive to minority needs, plaintiffs must prove it).
The Court's statement in Shaw that racially-drawn districts are likely to encourage elected officials to
represent the predominant race of their district also has broader implications than the Court may have
intended. If the Court is now prepared to assume that elected officials are more likely to give better
representation to the racial (or political) majority in the district that elected them, then it will have to
reexamine the issue of whether the lack of proportional representation for racial or political minorities is
sufficient to establish a constitutional violation, because the Court's rejection of proportional representation is
based in part on the notion that, absent proof to the contrary, elected officials are presumed to represent
everyone in their district.
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or trimming the minority percentages of those districts to achieve greater
compactness is not likely to eliminate racially polarized voting from the American
political scene, or to force elected officials to do a better job of representing racial
minorities (white or black) in their districts. The injuries the Court attributed to
minority redistricting are entirely nonresdressable by this relief. If anything,
making minority districts more competitive for whites is likely to achieve the
opposite result by giving whites greater incentive to appeal to a white voting bloc
to capture previously minority seats and thus increase racial bloc voting. 85
The question whether the creation of new majority-minority districts disserves
the American political process is a policy question that already has been addressed
by Congress. As the district court in Thornburg v. Gingles noted, Congress, in
amending Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act in 1982, considered but rejected
arguments by opponents that passage of the Voting Rights Act and, by
implication, the creation of minority districts to give minority voters equal
opportunities to elect candidates of their choice, posed significant risks to
fundamental political values.8 8 The reasons given by the Shaw majority for
disfavoring the creation of oddly-shaped minority districts are almost identical to
the arguments advanced in the hearings, committee deliberations, and floor debate
by the congressional opponents of the 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights
Act. 7 The legislative history of the passage of the Act, the district court in
Gingles observed, shows that in 1982 Congress rejected arguments addressing "the
risk that creating 'safe' black-majority single-member districts would perpetuate
racial ghettos and racial polarization in voting behavior" and "the fundamental
risk that the recognition of 'group voting rights' and the imposing of an affirmative
obligation upon government to secure those rights by race-conscious electoral
mechanisms was alien to the American political tradition.",a

85. In Mississippi, the three-judge district court in Jordan v. Winter, the congressional redistricting
case, adopted a district that was 54% black in population and 48% black in voting age population on the
theory that black voters were not entitled to a safe seat or to a maximization of their voting strength. Jordan v.
Winter, 541 F. Supp. 1135 (N.D. Miss. 1982), vacated and remanded, 461 U.S. 921 (1983). Instead of
requiring the white Republican candidate to seek black votes to get elected, the result was to encourage the
white candidate to make racial appeals to the white voting majority, thus increasing racial polarization in the
district. See Frank R. Parker, The Mississippi CongressionalRedistricting Case. A Case Study In Minority
Vote Dilution, 28 How. L.J. 397 (1985).
86. Gingles v. Edmisten, 590 F. Supp. 345, 356-57 (E.D.N.C. 1984) (three-judge court), affd In
relevant part sub nom. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
87. Laughlin McDonald, Holder v. Hall: Blinking at Minority Voting Rights, 3 D.C. L REV. 61. 77-81
(1995).
88. Edmisten, 590 F. Supp. at 356-57.
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Despite the strong reservations expressed elsewhere by some members of the
Shaw majority that the Court should not be legislating public policy in voting
rights cases,8" the Supreme Court majority in Shaw, by holding that the creation
of strangely-shaped minority districts offends those principles, makes itself
vulnerable to the charge that it is substituting its own public policy views for those
more appropriately made by Congress.

IV. MINORITY REDISTRICTING AS A RACIAL CLASSIFICATION

The Court in Shaw acknowledged that the congressional redistricting plan at
issue was not a true racial classification because it was racially neutral on its face,
that is, the redistricting statute did not classify the districts explicitly by race.90
However, the Court ruled that because the bizarre shapes of the districts made the
districts unexplainable on grounds other than race, the same strict scrutiny
principles applicable to express racial classifications-statutes that expressly
discriminate on the basis of race-should apply to the challenged redistricting
plan. Labelling the plan a racial classification, the Court concluded, circumvented
the need for proof of discriminatory purpose and required the State to show that
the plan was "narrowly tailored to further a compelling governmental interest." '
Thus, the Court's reasoning was: (1) no inquiry into legislative purpose is
necessary for express racial classifications; (2) express racial classifications invoke
the strict scrutiny standard of review; (3) although the challenged redistricting
plan is not an express racial classification, plaintiffs contend that the districts are
so bizarre that they are unexplainable on grounds other than race; (4) this makes
the redistricting plan a racial classification so that proof of discriminatory purpose
is not required, and the plan is subject to strict scrutiny.92
The validity of the Court's reasoning rests upon its two principal contentions
that, despite the absence of an express racial reference, the North Carolina
redistricting plan is a racial classification, and, because it is a racial classification,
although facially-neutral, no finding of discriminatory purpose is required to
subject the plan to the strict scrutiny standard.

89.
90.
91.
92.

See Holder v. Hall, 114 S.Ct. 2581, 2591-619 (1994) (Thomas, J.,
concurring, joined by Scalia, J.).
Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2825.
Id.
Id. at 2824-25.
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A.

Distinctions Between Past Racial Classifications and Minority Redistricting
Unconstitutional racial classifications-overt

and covert-according to the

Court's prior decisions, fall within one or more of three categories: (1) those that
treat individuals or groups differently because of race and systematically
disadvantage a racial group;9 3 (2) those that are based on perceptions of inferiority
of a particular racial group or otherwise reflect racial hostility or prejudice;0 and
(3) those that are motivated by a racially discriminatory purpose. 0
93. E.g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) (striking down a municipal boundary revision
from a square shape to a 28-sided figure that retained all the white voters within the city limits but excluded
almost all the black voters); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939) (holding unconstitutional state voter
registration law that discriminated against black citizens by requiring all citizens to register to vote during
specified 12-day period in 1916, but exempted anyone who voted in the 1914 election when racially
discriminatory grandfather clause favoring whites was in effect); Guinn v. United States, 238 US. 347 (1915)
(striking down Oklahoma "grandfather clause" that discriminated against black citizens by imposing a
literacy test for voter registration but exempting anyone entitled to vote on or before January I, 1866, and
their lineal descendants, all of whom were white); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (invalidating San
Francisco laundry ordinance that prohibited laundry operations in wooden buildings, almost all of which were
Chinese laundries); see Paul Brest, In Defense of the AntidiscriminatlonPrinciple, 90 HARv. L. RE . 1. 5-10
(1976).
The Supreme Court's decisions protecting whites from explicit racial classifications in Bakke and
subsequent cases also fall into this category.
94. E.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984) (striking down denial of child custody to child's mother
because of marriage to a black man based on societal racial prejudice); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 7
(1967) (state law prohibiting intermarriage between whites and blacks unconstitutional because, even though
it applied equally to both races, its purpose to prevent "the corruption of blood." -a mongrel breed of
citizens," and the "obliteration of racial pride" made it a measure "obviously endors[ing] White Supremacy."
(quoting Naim v. Naim, 87 S.E.2d 749, 756 (Va.), vacated. 350 U.S. 891 (1955))); Anderson v. Martin, 375
U.S. 399, 402 (1964) (state law requiring election officials to list race of the candidates on the ballot violated
the Equal Protection Clause because it placed "the power of the State behind a racial classification that
induces racial prejudice at the polls"); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1880) (state law
excluding black citizens from jury service held unconstitutional because it violated right secured by the
Fourteenth Amendment to be free of legal discriminations "implying inferiority in civil society"); see Brest,
supra note 93, at 5-10; Michael J. Perry, Modern Equal Protection: A Conceptualizationand Appraisal. 79
COLUM. L. Rav. 1023, 1025-32 (1979).
95. E.g., Loving 388 U.S. at 11 ("There is patently no legitimate overriding purpose independent of
invidious racial discrimination which justifies this classification."); Gomlllion, 364 US. at 341 (If plaintiffs'
allegations were proved, "the conclusions would be irresistible, tantamount for all practical purposes to a
mathematical demonstration, that the legislation is solely concerned with segregating white and colored voters
by fencing Negro citizens out of town so as to deprive them of their pre-existing municipal vote'"). Guinn. 238
US. at 363 (finding the voter registration "embodying ... no discernable reason other than the purpose to
disregard the prohibitions of the [Fifteenth] Amendment"); Yick Wo, 118 US. at 374 ("No reason for [the
discrimination] is shown, and the conclusion cannot be resisted, that no reason for it exists except hostility to
.. . [Yick Wo's] race and nationality .... "); see JOHN HART ELY, DaFsocrtAcY AND DtsRtusr 145-48
(1980). In Shaw the Court did not acknowledge that Gomillion and Gulnn were discriminatory purpose cases.
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In Shaw there was never any question whether the state legislature used race in
devising the redistricting plan; the State freely admitted that it intentionally drew
the two majority-black districts to comply with the Voting Rights Act. n9 However,
the Court has never adopted a per se rule against the use of race in government
decision-making, and in Shaw, reaffirmed that it "never has held that raceconscious state decisionmaking is impermissible in all circumstances. '97 There
must be some types of explicit governmental use of race, such as racial datagathering, as in each decennial census, and perhaps sickle-cell anemia testing, that
are so harmless that no constitutional issues are raised. Calling the Shaw
redistricting plan a racial classification subject to strict scrutiny directly poses the
question: if a facially-neutral statute that admittedly uses race as a criterion
nonetheless possesses none of the characteristics of past racial classifications, can it
be a racial classification?
No one claimed that the North Carolina redistricting plan implied racial
inferiority or reflected racial hostility or prejudice, nor did anyone claim that it
was motivated by a racially discriminatory purpose. If it is a racial classification,
then, it must be because it treats persons differently because of race and
systematically disadvantages a particular racial group. However, the Court's
decisions in this first category show that there is no comparison between the
minority redistricting plan challenged in Shaw and the unequal treatment
according minorities in those decisions. In Yick Wo v. Hopkins,"8 the Chinese
laundry case, the city ordinance that prohibited laundry operations in wooden
buildings made almost all of the 240 laundries operated by Chinese proprietors
illegal, but the city exempted laundries operated in wooden buildings by nonAsians. The Oklahoma "grandfather clause" in Guinn v. United States"9 imposed
a literacy test for voter registration on all the state's African-American citizens,
but imposed a literacy test on only a handful of white citizens because the statute
This is discussed in the next section.
96. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2838 (White, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 2824. In four of the six affirmative action cases decided prior to Shaw v. Reno, the Court
sustained challenged racial preferences. See United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987); Local No. 93,
Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501 (1986); Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers'
Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421 (1986); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980). The Court struck
down racial preferences in Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986) and Firefighters Local
Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984). In Fullilove, for example, only two Justices were willing to
adopt a per se rule that would prohibit any use of race in minority set-aside contracts, 448 U.S. at 522-32
(Stewart, J., joined by Rehnquist, J.).
98. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
99. 238 U.S. 347 (1915).
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exempted from the literacy test all persons (and their lineal descendants) who were
entitled to vote on or before January 1, 1866, when African Americans were
denied the right to vote. Similarly, the voter registration requirement in Lane v.
Wilson0 ° systematically discriminated against black citizens because it allowed
voter registration for only 12 days between April 30 and May 11, 1916, but
exempted whites who had voted in the 1914 general election under the previous
grandfather clause law. Finally, in Gomillion v. Lightfoot,'0' the city's action in
redrawing the municipal boundaries kept all the whites within the city limits but
excluded all but four or five of the city's 400 black voters. In these cases the Court
could truly say that although the statutes were racially neutral on their face, their
discriminatory impact showed that they were, in effect, racial classifications
because they discriminated against minorities just as effectively as if they had
contained an express racial classification.
In its description of the North Carolina plan, the Shaw Court attempted to
shoehorn the challenged districts into the framework of these cases by overblown
rhetoric that employed the language of racial segregation, but the facts of Shaw
show that the case does not fit. The Court described the challenged plan as "an
effort to segregate the races for purposes of voting,"102 "political apartheid," 03 a
"racial gerrymander,"' 0 4 and "an effort to separate voters into different districts on
the basis of race,"'0 5 but in fact none of the challenged districts were racially
segregated in any normal sense of the term. The two contested majority-black
districts were actually the most racially mixed of the North Carolina
districts-District 1 was 53.4% black and 45.5% white and District 12 was
53.3% black and 45.2% white in voting age population. All of the districts
contained both blacks and whites, '° and a majority of the State's black voting age

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

307 U.S. 268 (1939).
364 U.S. 339 (1960).
Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2824.
Id. at 2827.
Id.
Id. at 2828.
The voting age population (VAP) percentages by race of the districts was:
District
District
District
District
District
District

1
2
3
4
5
6

White VAP
45.49%
78.24%
78.60%
78.52%
85.10%
91.87%

Black VAP
53.40%
20.07%
19.64%
18.93%
14.04%
7.05%
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population-57 %-was actually placed in the majority-white districts, not the two
07
majority-black districts.1
Unlike the Court's past racial classification cases, there was nothing about the
Shaw redistricting plan that systematically divided, discriminated against, or
disadvantaged any race in any manner. The plan did not contain any reserved
districts-set aside for members of one race-or constitute a racial quota. Even in
the two majority-black districts, white candidates and black candidates were free
to compete for white and black votes, and although the election of black
candidates was likely, it was not required. Further, the plan did not constitute a
racial preference for black voters, but simply gave black voters an equal
opportunity to elect candidates of their choice in the two majority-black districts
on the same basis as the white voters in the ten majority-white districts.
Because the North Carolina redistricting plan shared none of the characteristics
associated with racial classifications in the Court's prior cases, there is serious
doubt whether the Court was correct to label the plan a racial classification within
the Court's existing case law.
B.

Facially-NeutralRacial Classifications and the Discriminatory Purpose
Requirement

The Shaw majority's view that a facially-neutral racial classification that has no
discriminatory impact can be unconstitutional without any proof of discriminatory
purpose directly conflicts with the Court's prior rulings. The Court in Shaw itself
noted that the "central purpose" of the Equal Protection Clause "is to prevent the
States from purposefully discriminating between individuals on the basis of
race."'' 08 Since Washington v. Davis"9 in 1976, the Court has consistently required
proof of discriminatory purpose to establish an equal protection violation. In City

District
District
District
District
District
District

7
8
9
10
11
12

74.02%
74.02%
90.22%
94.31%
92.01%
45.21%

17.15%
20.90%
8.03%
4.94%
6.37%
53.34%

Brief for the Federal Appellees at 16a, Shaw (No. 92-357).
107. Of the state's 1,007,876 voting age black persons, 433,212 (43%) were in the two majority-black
districts. Id.
108. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2824 (emphasis added).
109. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
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of Mobile v. Bolden," 0 in which the Court rejected a challenge by black voters to
at-large municipal elections for dilution of black voting strength, the Court
emphasized that "only if there is purposeful discrimination can there be a violation
of the Equal Protection Clause.""'
The Shaw plaintiffs did not contend that the challenged plan was motivated by a
racially discriminatory purpose; nor did they claim that the state legislature passed
the plan for the purpose or with the effect of diluting white or black voting
strength.112 How, then, can the Washington v. Davis discriminatory purpose
requirement be reconciled with Shaw, in which the Court found an equal
protection violation without proof that the challenged plan was drawn with a
discriminatory purpose? The Shaw Court attempted to resolve this conflict by
concluding that if express racial classifications can be unconstitutional without
proof of discriminatory purpose, then the same standard should apply to faciallyneutral racial classifications.
This conclusion rests on the Court's reasoning that Village of Arlington Heights
v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation,"' the exclusionary zoning
case, and Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, " ' the veteran's
preference case, endorse this view, and that the Court's voting rights precedents
also support this conclusion."1 5 The Court cited Arlington Heights for the view
that no inquiry into legislative purpose is necessary to invoke strict scrutiny for
race-neutral statutes that are "unexplainable on grounds other than race,"116 and
Feeney for the notion that these principles apply "as well to a classification that is
ostensibly neutral but is an obvious pretext for racial discrimination." 1 7
An analysis of these cases, however, shows that they fail to support the Shaw
Court's view and, contrary to the Shaw Court's interpretation, the Supreme Court
in other cases has consistently regarded them as discriminatory purpose cases.
Thus, not only do they not stand for the proposition that a facially-neutral racial
classification is unconstitutional without proof of discriminatory purpose, but they
actually support the contrary principle that proof of discriminatory purpose is

110.
111.
252, 265
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

446 U.S. 55 (1980).
Id. at 66. See also Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dcv. Corp., 429 U.S.
(1977); Davis, 426 U.S. at 240.
Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2824.
429 U.S. 252 (1977).
442 U.S. 256 (1979).
Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2824-27.
Arlington Heights, 429 US. at 266.
Feeney, 442 U.S. at 272 (citing ick Wo. Guinn. Lane. and Gomullion).
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required. The result is a glaring inconsistency between the Court's construction of
these cases in Shaw v. Reno and the Court's immediate prior equal protection
jurisprudence on the requirement of proof of discriminatory purpose.
In Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development
Corporation,"8 a Fourteenth Amendment challenge to an exclusionary zoning
ordinance, the Court reaffirmed its pronouncement in Washington v. Davis that
disproportionate impact is "not the sole touchstone of an invidious racial
discrimination"' 19 and that "[piroof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is
required to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause." 120 The Court
indicated that "[d]etermining whether invidious discriminatory purpose was a
motivating factor demands a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct
evidence of intent as may be available."'' The Court then listed Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, Guinn v. United States, Lane v. Wilson, and Gomillion v. Lightfoot as
supporting the principle that a severe discriminatory impact-"a clear pattern,
unexplainable on grounds other than race"-may support an inference of
discriminatorypurpose "even when the governing legislation appears neutral on its
2
face.",1
Thus, contrary to what the Court said in Shaw, the Court in Arlington Heights
did not hold that state laws that are "unexplainable on grounds other than race"
are exempt from the discriminatory purpose requirement. Instead, the Court held
that a clear pattern of systematic discrimination that is unexplainable on grounds
other than race-without more-may support an inference of racially
discriminatory purpose. Proof of discriminatory purpose is still required, but proof
of an adverse impact as "stark as that in Gomillion or Yick Wo" may be sufficient
2
to prove it.' '
Neither does the Court's decision in Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts

429 U.S. 252 (1977).
Id. at 265 (quoting Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976)).
Id.
Id. at 266.
The impact of the official action whether it "bears more heavily on one race than another,"
Washington v. Davis, may provide an important starting point. Sometimes a clear pattern,
unexplainable on grounds other than race, emerges from the effect of the state action even
when the governing legislation appears neutral on its face. Yick Wo v. Hopkins; Gulnn v.
United States; Lane v. Wilson; Gomillion v. Lightfoot. The evidentiary inquiry is then
relatively easy. But such cases are rare. Absent a pattern as stark as that in Gomlllion or Ylck
Wo, impact alone is not determinative, and the Court must look to other evidence.
Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266 (citations omitted) (footnotes omitted).
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

123.

Id.
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v. Feeney 24 support the Court's contention that legislative purpose is irrelevant.
The Court's discussion of this issue in Feeney, including sentences that the Shaw
Court left out of its quotation from that decision, suggests that Feeney is consistent
with the Washington v. Davis/Arlington Heights line of cases that directly
preceded it, and that the Court's contrary conclusion in Shaw is based upon a
misinterpretation of what the Court said in Feeney. Feeney was a Fourteenth
Amendment challenge of gender discrimination against women to a state statute
that granted an absolute veterans' preference for state civil service jobs. Despite
the fact that 98.2% of the State's veterans were male, and only 1.8 % were female,
the Court upheld the constitutionality of the statute on the grounds that its
purpose was to benefit veterans as veterans, including men and women veterans,
and it was enacted for a legitimate purpose and not as a covert gender
classification for the purpose of discriminating against women.12 5
In reaching this conclusion, the Court applied the Washington v. Davis]
Arlington Heights standard that requires proof of a discriminatory purpose for an
equal protection violation. In the passage quoted in the Shaw opinion, 2 ' the
Feeney Court articulated this standard:
Certain classifications, however, in themselves supply a reason to infer
antipathy. Race is the paradigm. A racial classification, regardless of
purported motivation, is presumptively invalid and can be upheld only upon
an extraordinary justification. This rule applies as well to a classification that
is ostensibly neutral but is an obvious pretext for racial discrimination. Yick
Wo v. Hopkins; Guinn v. United States; cf. Lane v. Wilson; Gomillion v.
Lightfoot. But, as was made clear in Washington v. Davis and Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., even if a neutral law has a
disproportionately adverse effect upon a racial minority, it is
unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause only if that impact can
be traced to a discriminatory purpose.127
The references to classifications that "supply a reason to infer antipathy" and
those that are "an obvious pretext for racial discrimination" imply a
discriminatory purpose, and the discriminatory purpose requirement is made

124. 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
125. Id. at 274-81.
126.

Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2825.

127. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 272 (emphasis on sentences omitted in Shaw) (case citations omitted).
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explicit in the last sentence which was entirely omitted from the quotation in
Shaw.
The Court in Feeney stated that there were two questions to be considered:
whether the statute was a gender-based classification, although facially neutral;
and whether its adverse effect reflected purposeful discrimination.12 8 Despite the
fact that the Court considered these to be separate questions-which might
support a distinction between racial classifications and statutes that require proof
of discriminatory purpose-the Court concluded that both questions were
answered by the district court's findings that the statute served legitimate purposes
and was not passed for the purpose of discriminating against women. 120 Feeney
thus suggests that the issue of discriminatory purpose is relevant to both questions,
and that an inquiry into legislative purpose is necessary both to determine whether
a facially-neutral statute is a prohibited classification and whether its adverse
impact can be attributed to a discriminatory purpose. The Court's ultimate
holding, that plaintiffs' failure to demonstrate a discriminatory purpose showed
both that the statute was not a gender classification and that its disparate impact
did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, in effect, merges the suspect
classification and discriminatory purpose modes of analysis (at least for faciallyneutral statutes) and contradicts the Court's view in Shaw that an inquiry into
legislative purpose is irrelevant for facially-neutral statutes that allegedly reflect a
suspect classification. 130
The Shaw Court also thought that the Court's voting rights precedents, Guinn,
Gomillion, and Wright v. Rockefeller,181-involving mostly Fifteenth Amendment,
not Fourteenth Amendment claims-were racial classification cases in which the
Court applied strict scrutiny without proof of discriminatory intent. 18 2 However,
this constitutional revisionism runs up against the Court's description of these very
same cases as discriminatory purpose cases in City of Mobile v. Bolden.
The contrast between the descriptions of these cases in Shaw and Bolden
highlights the inconsistencies between Shaw and prior cases. The Shaw majority
believed that the grandfather clause challenged in Guinn v. United States was only

128. Id. at 274.
129. Id. at 274-75.
130. In his concurring opinion, Justice Stevens, joined by Justice White, expressly rejected any
distinction between the questions whether a facially-neutral statute is covertly gender-based and whether its
adverse effects reflect discriminatory purpose. Id. at 281.
131. 376 U.S. 52 (1964) (rejecting minority voters' challenge to congressional redistricting plan because
districts allegedly were drawn on the basis of race).
132. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2825-26.
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unconstitutional because it was a covert racial classification which "on its face...
could not be explained on grounds other than race."12 3 The Bolden Court
described Guinn as tne of the Court's decisions that "have made clear that action
by a State that is racially neutral on its face violates the Fifteenth Amendment
only if motivated by a discriminatory purpose." 1'3 Similarly, the Shaw Court
characterized Gomillion as supporting the contention that districts drawn along
racial lines require strict scrutiny, "regardless of the motivations underlying their
adoption,"13 5 whereas the Court in Bolden described the same case as one of
"[t]he Court's more recent decisions [that] confirm[s] the principle that racially
discriminatory motivation is a necessary ingredient of a Fifteenth Amendment
violation." 136 Finally, the Shaw Court construed Wright v.Rockefeller, as a case
in which the Supreme Court majority merely "accepted the District Court's
finding that the plaintiffs had failed to establish that the districts were in fact
drawn on racial lines,"1 37 while the Bolden Court cited it as confirming that
racially discriminatory motivation is a necessary ingredient of a constitutional
violation.a

The notion that racial classifications can be subject to strict scrutiny without
reference to a discriminatory legislative purpose is also inconsistent with the
Court's decision in City of Memphis v. Greene,1 39 reaffirming that discriminatory
purpose analysis is controlling in the Court's equal protection cases. In Greene, the
City of Memphis closed the main thoroughfare at Jackson Avenue, the boundary
line between a predominantly black part of the city and an all-white enclave, to
any vehicle traffic. The street barrier disadvantaged black residents living north of
the all-white enclave by preventing them from taking the most direct route to
Overton Park, which included the city's zoo, golf course, and recreation facilities,
and the central portion of the city.
The street barrier in City of Memphis v. Greene segregated the races to a far
greater extent than the congressional districts in Shaw v. Reno. The neighborhood
133. Id. at 2825.
134. Bolden, 446 U.S. at 62.
135. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2826.
136. Bolden, 446 U.S. at 62. To emphasize this point, the Court in footnote 10 stated: "The Court has
repeatedly cited Gomillion v. Lightfoot for the principle that an invidious purpose must be adduced to support
a claim of unconstitutionality. See PersonnelAdministrator of Mass. v. Feeney. 442 US. 256, 272; Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 US. 252, 265; Washington v. Davis, 426 US. 229, 240."
Bolden, 446 U.S. at 63 n.10 (parallel citations omitted).
137. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2826.
138. Bolden, 446 U.S. at 63.
139. 451 US. 100 (1981).
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north of the street barrier was predominantly black, and the neighborhood south of
the barrier was exclusively white. The barrier literally fenced mostly black drivers
out of the all-white enclave, and fenced the white residents in. If legislative
purpose is irrelevant to facially-neutral racial classifications, under the Court's
interpretation of Gomillion v. Lightfoot and related cases in Shaw v. Reno, this
street barrier should have been labelled a racial classification subject to strict
scrutiny because it segregated Memphis residents along racial lines. But the Court
failed to employ such an analysis and instead held that the controlling Fourteenth
Amendment question was whether plaintiffs had proved a discriminatory
purpose.1 40 Rejecting the plaintiffs' constitutional and statutory claims, the Court
found that the purpose of the street barrier was to protect the safety and
tranquility of the white neighborhood and that there was "no evidence that the
closing was motivated by any racially exclusionary desire."'4
To summarize, despite the fact that the Supreme Court termed the minority
redistricting plan in Shaw v. Reno a racial classification, the plan failed to fit into
any traditionally-recognized category of racial classification. The North Carolina
plan had no discriminatory impact and did not systematically disadvantage any
racial group, nor did it reflect views of the racial inferiority of any group or imply
racial hostility or prejudice, and it was not motivated by a racially discriminatory
purpose.
The Court therefore appears to have made up a new, unprecedented category of
racial classification unlike any it has recognized before. Besides being
unprecedented, this new category of racial classification has an inconsistent
application. The Court restricted the application of this new doctrine to oddlyshaped districts, suggesting that when a state legislature uses race to draw district
lines, and the districts are oddly-shaped, the plan is a racial classification. But
when the legislature uses race, and the districts are compact, it is not a racial
classification. Not surprisingly, the Court failed to provide any explanation or
doctrinal support for this distinction.
Further, even if the plan may properly be termed a facially-neutral racial
classification, the Court's contention that such a classification is subject to strict
scrutiny without proof of discriminatory purpose directly contradicts the Court's
prior holdings in Washington v. Davis and subsequent decisions that state action

140. Greene, 451 U.S. at 119-20. The Court also held that the street barrier did not interfere with
property interests protected by 42 U.S.C. § 1982, id. at 120-24, and was not a badge or incident of slavery
prohibited by the Thirteenth Amendment, id. at 124-29.
141. Id. at 114. See Kairys, supra note 19.
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that is racially neutral on its face violates the Fourteenth Amendment only if
motivated by a discriminatory purpose. Indeed, the very same cases upon which
the Court relied-Arlington Heights and Feeney-are discriminatory purpose
cases, and the Guinn/Gomillion/ Wright line of voting rights cases, upon which the
Court based its ruling, have been consistently construed by the Court since
Washington v. Davis as discriminatory purpose cases. This inconsistency seriously
undermines the doctrinal legitimacy of the Shaw decision because the plaintiffs did
not contend that the challenged plan was racially discriminatory in purpose or
effect, nor was there proof that it was. The absence of any firm support for the
majority's view that facially-neutral racial classifications need no proof of
discriminatory purpose in the Court's prior decisions suggests that the dissenting
Justices are correct that the Shaw plaintiffs failed to present any cognizable claim
of injury because of the absence of any allegation of discriminatory purpose or
effect.

14 2

The Court's dramatic reinterpretation of its prior equal protection cases in Shaw
also raises the troubling issue of whether the Court has developed a double
standard for voting rights cases depending on the race of the plaintiffs and the
racial composition of the challenged districts. Since Washington v. Davis, the
Court has required black, Hispanic, and other minority plaintiffs challenging
minority vote dilution to prove discriminatory intent to establish a Fourteenth
Amendment violation. In contrast, the Court in Shaiw-relying upon the same
cases the Court considered controlling in Washington, Arlington Heights, and
Bolden-appears to have established a new rule that allows white voters to strike
down majority-minority districts that enhance minority voting strength without
proving discriminatory purpose. Further, in the Washington/Arlington Heights/
Bolden cases the minority plaintiffs were required to meet a stringent standard of
proof of discriminatory purpose under which, for the most part, only direct or
"smoking gun," evidence of discriminatory purpose suffices. 4 ' In the Shaw-type
142. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2834-43 (White, J., dissenting): id. at 2844-45 (Blackmun. J., dissenting); Id.
at 2849 (Souter, J., dissenting).
143. See, e.g., City of Mobile v. Bolden. 446 U.S. 55 (1980); Cross v. Baxter, 639 F.2d 1383 (5th Cir.
1981); Jordan v. City of Greenwood, 534 F. Supp. 1351 (N.D. Miss. 1980). vacated and remanded on other
grounds, 711 F.2d 667 (5th Cir. 1983); Kirksey v. City of Jackson. 506 F. Supp. 491 (S.D. Miss. 1981). afd,
663 F.2d 659 (5th Cir. 1982). But see Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982) (discriminatory purpose may bha
proved by indirect evidence). For a criticism of the discriminatory purpose requirement in .oting rights cases,
see Voting Rights Act: Hearings on Bills to Amend the Voting Rights Act of 1965 Before the Subcomm. on
the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary. 97th Cong.. 2d Sess., Vol. 1. 1182-1226 (1982)
(statement of Frank R. Parker, Director, Voting Rights Project, Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under

Law).
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cases, by comparison, all the mostly white plaintiffs need do is hold up the map of
the minority districts; if the shapes of the districts satisfy the Shaw standard of
bizarreness, they are presumptively unconstitutional and may be sustained only if
they satisfy the strict scrutiny test that, as one commentator has observed, is
actually "strict-in-theory, fatal-in-fact." 44
V.

THE COMPACTNESS ISSUE

The Supreme Court in Shaw rejected the plaintiffs' claim that the Fourteenth
Amendment requires colorblind redistricting, but held that racial redistricting
which results in majority-minority districts-districts that are "unusually shaped,"
"snake-like," "bizarre," "extremely irregular," and "irrational on [their]
face"-are subject to strict scrutiny. 145 Thus, the Court made compactness the
touchstone of a constitutional violation while simultaneously, in contradictory
fashion, purporting to maintain that compactness in redistricting is not
constitutionally required. 46 By identifying compactness of districts as the critical
element of its newly-created equal protection claim, the Shaw decision reaches out
to create a new constitutional test that is conceptually flawed, at variance with
prior racial gerrymandering cases, and lacking objective, judicially-manageable

standards.
The Court's new standard is deeply flawed because it is based on the
fundamental conceptual error that irregular district shapes, as opposed to
discriminatory dilution of voting strength, are the principal distinguishing
characteristic of racial gerrymandering. After describing past examples of what
the Court termed the "deliberate and arbitrary distortion of district boundaries...
144. Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a
Newer Equal Protection,86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972). See, e.g., Johnson v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. 1354 (S.D.
Ga. 1994) (three-judge court), prob.juris noted, 115 S. Ct. 713 (1995); Hays v. Louisiana, 862 F. Supp. 119
(W.D. La. 1994) (three-judge court), prob. juris. noted, 115 S. Ct. 687 (1995); Vera v. Richards, 861 F.
Supp. 1304 (S.D. Tex. 1994), appeal docketed, 63 U.S.L.W. 3476 (U.S. Dec. 1, 1994).
145. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2821, 2824, 2825, 2828, 2829.
146. Id. at 2827 ("compactness or attractiveness has never been held to constitute an independent
federal constitutional requirement for state legislative districts." (citing Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735,
752 n.18 (1973))). Previously, what the Court termed "traditional districting principles" (compactness,
contiguity, and preserving political subdivision boundaries) were left to state enforcement and were regarded
as legitimate state policies that justified some deviations from strict compliance with the one-person, one-vote
requirement in the state legislative redistricting cases. Also, the Court held that irregular district lines could
create an inference of impermissible racial or partisan gerrymandering, but not without proof of
discriminatory intent and actual harm to minority or party voters.
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for [racial] purposes,"'417 the Court concluded: "[i]t is unsettling how closely the
North Carolina plan resembles the most egregious racial gerrymanders of the
14 8
past."
Contrary to the Shaw majority's view, commentators on redistricting have long
recognized that irregular shapes "are not always reliable signs that partisan (or
racial or ethnic or factional) interests are being served, while the most regularly
drawn district may turn out to have been skillfully constructed with an intent to
aid one party." 1 9 The Court has never found a constitutional violation based
exclusively or primarily on district shape. In Davis v. Bandemer, the political
gerrymandering case, the Court plurality-relying on the racial vote dilution
cases-identified two elements of a Fourteenth Amendment gerrymandering claim:
a plaintiff must "prove both intentional discrimination against an identifiable
political group and an actual discriminatory effect on that group."leo0 The
"deliberate and arbitrary distortion of boundaries," the plurality determined,
drawn "with the specific intention of disadvantaging one political party's election
prospects," does not amount to a constitutional violation "unless the redistricting
does in fact disadvantage [one party's election prospects] at the polls."""l The
Court in Bandemer and prior cases regarded the shapes of the districts as
probative of intentional discrimination,""a but never espoused the view that
gerrymandering could be unconstitutional solely because of the shape of the
districts without corresponding evidence of a discriminatory effect.'9 3
The Shaw Court disregarded these teachings and picked as its definition of
racial gerr3hnandering a portion of Justice Powell's concurring and dissenting
opinion in Bandemer in which he described gerrymandering as "the deliberate and
arbitrary distortion of district boundaries . . . for partisan or personal political
purposes."'" However, this quotation omits the rest of the paragraph in which

147. Id. at 2823 (quoting Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 164 (1986) (Powell. J.. concurring in part
and dissenting in part)).
148.

Id. at 2824.

149. Robert J. Sickels, Dragons. Bacon Strips. and Dumbbells- Who's Afraid of Reapportionment,75
YALE L.J. 1300 (1966).
150. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 127.
151. Id. at 138-39.
152. Id. at 127-28; see also Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
153. In Bandemer, for example, the plurality found intentional discrimination, but rejected plaintiffs'
political gerrymandering claim for lack of sufficient proof of an adverse effect. 478 U.S. at 129-37.
154. Id. at 164 (quoting Justice Fortas's concurring opinion in Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 294 U.S. 526,
538 (1969)), quoted in Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2823. The Shaw Court not only took this quotation completely out
of context, as the following discussion shows, but also gave the quotation itself a different meaning by inserting
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Justice Powell stated that gerrymandering violates the Equal Protection Clause
only when it also has a discriminatory effect and "serves 'no purpose other than to
favor one segment-whether racial, ethnic, religious, economic, or political-that
may occupy a position of strength at a particular time, or to disadvantage a
politically weak segment of the community.' "115 Because the Shaw plaintiffs did
not claim that the North Carolina redistricting plan favored one racial group or
disadvantaged another, the plan they challenged failed to fit even Justice Powell's
concept of racial gerrymandering upon which the Shaw majority relied in framing
its definition.
The definition of gerrymandering adopted by the Shaw majority was tailored to
fit the circumstances of the case, and as such contradicts the bulk of scholarly
authority, historical examples, and judicial decisions in racial gerrymandering
cases. Robert G. Dixon, Jr., one of the leading scholars on redistricting, defined
gerrymandering as districting arrangements that "transmute one party's actual
voter strength into the maximum number of legislative seats and transmute the
other party's actual voter strength into the minimum number of legislative
07
seats,"' 5 focusing on the dilution of the opposition's voting strength.
Concentrating on compactness, Dixon thought, shifts attention from the impact of
the districts on political groups' voting strength to an emphasis on "mere physical
58
geography.'
Striking examples of racial gerrymandering over the past 30 years demonstrate
that although lack of compactness frequently has been associated with racial
gerrymandering, non-compact districts are not necessarily its principal or essential
characteristic. These cases show that there can be racial gerrymandering that
nonetheless complies with all the elements of what the Shaw court called the
"traditional districting principles [of] ... compactness, contiguity, and respect for

political subdivisions."' 15 9
In Sims v. Baggett,6 0 the Alabama Legislature-six weeks after the Voting

the word "racial" in brackets in the quotation when there was no reference to race in the original.
155. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 164 (emphases added) (quoting Justice Stevens' concurring opinion in
Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 748 (1983)).
156.

157.

ROBERT G. DIXON, JR., DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION IN LAW AND POLITIcs 460 (1968).
See Frank R. Parker, Racial Gerrymandering and Legislative Reapportionment, in MINORITY

86 (Chandler Davidson ed., 1984) ("Racial gerrymandering includes any redistricting scheme
which minimizes or dilutes the voting strength of racial minorities.") (hereinafter Racial Gerrymandering).
158. DIXON, supra note 156, at 460.
159. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2827.
160. 247 F. Supp. 96 (M.D. Ala. 1965).
VOTE DILUTION
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Rights Act became law-passed a new state legislative redistricting plan that split
up contiguous majority-black counties in east-central Alabama and combined
them with adjoining, predominantly-white counties in separate multimember
districts. All of the districts were regular in shape, contiguous, and followed county
lines.1 61 Yet the district court found a Fourteenth Amendment violation,
concluding that majority-black counties and majority-white counties "were
combined needlessly into a single House district for the sole purpose of preventing
16 2
the election of a Negro House member."
Similarly, in one of the classic post-Voting Rights Act racial gerrymanders, the
Mississippi Legislature's 1966 congressional redistricting plan split up the
predominantly-black Mississippi Delta area, which previously had been contained
within one district, transforming a majority-black congressional district into three
new districts that were all majority-white in voting age population.10 3 In Connor v.
Johnson, the districts were relatively compact, contiguous, and based on whole
counties. 1 Despite extensive evidence of discriminatory intent from the legislative
debates, the district court rejected a Fourteenth Amendment challenge to the plan
because the districts did not look like the 28-sided municipal boundary change
condemned by the Supreme Court in Gomillion v. Lightfoot.'"
The Shaw Court also recognized that at-large elections that dilute minority
voting strength can be a form of racial gerrymandering."' 0 In every instance of
discriminatory at-large elections, the districts are as compact as the political
subdivision boundaries that encompass them, are contiguous, and follow political
subdivision lines. 167 These cases show that unusually-shaped districts are not
necessarily an attribute of racial gerrymandering.
On the other hand, while redistricting plans with compact districts may be racial
gerrymanders, odd-shaped districts may provide racial fairness in redistricting. As
Dixon recognized more than 25 years ago:

161. See UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGiTS, POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 29 (Map No. 2)
(1968).
162. Sims, 247 F. Supp. at 109 (footnote omitted).
163. Connor v. Johnson, 279 F. Supp. 619 (S.D. Miss. 1966) (three-judge court). aJ'd mem., 386 U.S.
483 (1967); see FRANK R. PARKER, BLACK VOTES CouNT. POLITICAL E5IPOWERIENT IN MISSissIPPI AFTER
1965 at 41-51 (1990) [hereinafter BLACK VOTES COuNr].
164. PARKER. BLACK VOTES CouNT, supra note 163, at 50.

165. Connor, 279 F. Supp. at 624.
166. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2823.
167. See. e.g., Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982) (at-large elections InBurke Count), Georgia);
White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973) (at-large legislative elections in Dallas and Bexar counties. Texas).
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[t]he reality is that odd-shaped districts sometimes may facilitate [an] unfair
advantage of one party over another. The reality also is that odd-shaped
districts may be one way, short of some proportional representation device, of
avoiding "wasted votes," i.e., of ensuring some minority representation by
18
recognizing a few relatively safe enclaves for the weaker party.
The racial gerrymandering cases teach that the shape of the districts is not
determinative of a gerrymander; but rather its principal feature is a discriminatory
impact on the voting strength of racial or political minorities. Minorities can be
adversely affected by at-large elections: "cracking"-fragmentation of a cohesive
minority population; "stacking"-combining a minority population concentration
with a larger majority concentration; and "packing"--overconcentrating minorities
in particular districts to dilute their impact in adjoining districts. 09
Despite the historical examples the Court referenced in the Shaw opinion and
used to buttress its argument-Mississippi's "shoestring" congressional district of
the 1870's and Gomillion v. Lightfoot'7o-the Supreme Court has never struck
down a legislative redistricting plan under the Fourteenth Amendment for racial
gerrymandering. The closest the Court has come was a case the Court did not cite,
Connor v. Finch,'17 the Mississippi state legislative reapportionment case. There
the Court held a court-ordered plan unconstitutional for population
malapportionment, but in providing "further guidance" to the district court in
redrawing the districts, on remand disapproved particular districts for racial
discrimination. 17 2 The Court criticized oddly-shaped district lines in Jackson, the
state capital, that fragmented black population concentrations without adequate
justification, and also rejected irregularly-shaped districts in southwest Mississippi
that combined majority-black counties with parts of majority-white counties. In
both cases, the Court said, the fragmentation of black population concentrations
despite alternatives that would have avoided this dilution "can lead ... to a charge
that the departures [from the district court's own guidelines] are explicable only in
terms of a purpose to minimize the voting strength of a minority group."'1 7
The principal feature of these districts is that they diluted black voting strength
by cracking-dividing up black concentrations (in Jackson)-and stacking
168.

DIXON, supra note 156, at 461.

169. Parker, Racial Gerrymandering,supra note 157, at 86-99.
170. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2823.
171. 431 U.S. 407 (1977).
172. Id. at 421-25.
173. Id.
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-- combining majority-black counties with parts of majority-white counties (in
southwest Mississippi). The districts were also oddly-shaped in the sense that more
compact alternatives were available, and the Court was willing to infer from their
shape, the availability of nondiscriminatory alternatives, and the lack of any other
justification that they may have been racially motivated. But the Court's principal
focus was on plaintiffs' claims of discriminatory impact, "departures [from the
district court's guidelines] which have the apparent effect of scattering Negro
voting concentrations among a number of white majority districts."' 7 Without this
discriminatory impact it is unlikely that the Court would have criticized these
districts in the district court's plan.
Not only do these cases-which the Court in Shaw did not discuss--contradict
the Court's view that odd district shapes are the identifying element of racial
gerrymandering, but the cases the Court did discuss also fail to support its
conclusion. The case upon which the Court most heavily relied,170 Gomillion v.
Lightfoot,""8 was not a legislative redistricting gerrymander at all, but a municipal
deannexation case.17 Justice Frankfurter, writing for the majority, focused on the
fact that the city's action, revising the municipal boundary from a square shape to
a 28-sided figure, kept all the white voters within the city limits, but excluded all
but 4 or 5 of the 400 black voters.17 8 The Court held that plaintiffs stated not a
Fourteenth Amendment claim but a Fifteenth Amendment claim, and not because
the black vote was diluted, but because the boundary change in a discriminatory
manner denied black voters the right to vote in municipal elections. 170 Although
the Court in Shaw attempted to draw a parallel with Gomillion, the cases are very
different. In Gomillion, black voters were directly harmed by being excluded from
the city and denied the right to vote in municipal elections, leading the Court to
conclude that the plan had been adopted for a racially discriminatory purpose.
Neither does Wright v. Rockefeller,8 " the other racial gerrymandering case
upon which the Court relied, 18 ' support the Court's definition of what constitutes a
racial gerrymander. In Wright, the first and only racial gerrymandering case
involving legislative districts to reach the Supreme Court, the plaintiffs made a

174. Id. at 422.
175. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2823, 2825, 2826.
176. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
177. DIxON, supra note 156, at 465.
178. Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 141.
179. Id.
180. 376 U.S. 52 (1964).
181. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2826.
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claim very similar to that of the Shaw plaintiffs. They contended that the
congressional districts in Manhattan violated the Fourteenth Amendment because
the districts were drawn along racial lines. For proof, the plaintiffs demonstrated
that blacks and Puerto Ricans were segregated into Adam Clayton Powell, Jr.'s
18th District in Harlem, which was 86.3% black and Puerto Rican, while the
remaining districts were predominantly white, and that there were zig-zags in the
district lines.18 2 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court rejected plaintiffs' claim based on
district court findings that plaintiffs failed to prove that the state legislature "was
either motivated by racial considerations or in fact drew the districts on racial
lines." 88
These cases show that the most common distinguishing feature of racial
gerrymandering is dilution of minority voting strength, usually by depriving black
or other minority voters of one or more majority-black or other minority districts
they previously had or that were readily available under alternative plans. Lack of
compactness is not the principal characteristic-or even an essential
characteristic-of racial gerrymandering. If the Court had considered cases such
as Sims v. Baggett, Connor v. Johnson, and Connor v. Finch, it would have
concluded that there is no basis for contending that the North Carolina plan
"closely resembles" past racial gerrymanders for the simple reason that these past
gerrymanders diluted black votes and denied black voters majority-black districts,
while the North Carolina plan created two new majority-black districts.
The North Carolina congressional redistricting plans in place before the 1990
Census more closely resemble past racial gerrymanders. Given the high
concentration of black people in the state's population, it would have been possible
to create one or two majority-black districts even before 1992. Instead, the state
legislature in these earlier plans carved up these black population concentrations
and dispersed the pieces among several majority-White congressional districts.
Under this analysis, it is more consistent with these prior cases to label the dilution
of black voting strength in the state's prior plans racial gerrymandering-in the
traditional sense-than what happened in 1992. If there is no dilution of white
voting strength, and all other things being equal, it robs the term "racial
gerrymander" of all meaning to apply it-as the Shaw Court did-equally to
redistricting plans that deny minorities majority-minority districts and to
redistricting plans that create them.
In the Court's prior cases, the shapes of the districts were relevant only as proof
182. Wright, 376 U.S. at 53-54.
183. Id. at 56.
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of discriminatory intent; if the district shapes are irregular, the courts can draw an
inference that the district lines were drawn for a discriminatory purpose. From
these cases, however, it is apparent that, absent any dilution of minority voting
strength, the irregular shapes of district lines alone would have been insufficient to
invalidate a redistricting plan. To take the principal example from the Court's
opinion,"" if the Tuskegee city limits had been redrawn to a 28-sided figure, but
the white and black percentages of the city had remained unchanged, it is unlikely
that the Court would have concluded that the boundary change established a
Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendment violation.1 85 This is what makes the Court's
departure from these prior cases so striking.
In Shaw, the Court for the first time sustained what it described as a "racial
gerrymandering" claim without any allegation or evidence of dilution of the voting
strength of any identifiable racial group. The Shaw decision also raises the issue of
what constitutes compactness. The Court appears to have endorsed a geographic
test, but in doing so failed to discuss the "functional compactness" standard
preferred by some courts in devising court-ordered congressional redistricting plans
after the 1990 Census. In both the South Carolina and California congressional
redistricting cases, Burton v. Sheheen"18 and Wilson v. Eu,1 67 the courts looked not
at whether the districts were symmetrical or attractive, but at whether the shapes
of the districts aided or facilitated the political process.'" 8 Under this functional
test, geographical compactness of districts is not an end in itself. Rather, the test
for compactness is whether the shape of the district permits "effective
representation:"
For example, a district would not be sufficiently compact if it was so spread
out that there was no sense of community, that is, if its members and its
representative could not effectively and efficiently stay in touch with each
other; or if it was so convoluted that there was no sense of community, that is,
if its members and its representative could not easily tell who actually lived
within the district. 89

184. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2823, 2825.
185. Id. at 2832.
186. 793 F. Supp. 1329 (D.S.C. 1992) (threc-judge court).
187. 823 P.2d 545 (Cal. 1992).
188. Burton, 793 F. Supp. at 1356-57; Wilson. 823 P.2d at 552-53.
189. Burton, 793 F. Supp. at 1356 (quoting Dillard v. Baldin County Bd. of Edue.. 686 F. Supp, 1459,
1465-66 (M.D. Ala. 1988)). For discussions of this functional compactness test. see DAVID BTLT.ER & BRtUcE
CAIN, CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICTING: COMPARATIVE AND THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 72-74 (1992). and
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This functional test has appeal as an alternative to merely looking at the shapes
of districts on maps, because map shapes are not visible on the ground and may
not have any relevance to determining whether a district is functional or not.
Candidates for public office want to know where the district boundaries are so they
know where to campaign in that district. Voters want to know what district they
reside in so they know where to vote, can become knowledgeable about the
candidates running in their district and decide who to vote for, and, after the
elections, know which representative to go to when they need help from
government. Representatives want districts with defined boundaries so they know
the geographical definition of their constituency and where to go to visit the parts
of their district. If the district shapes meet these requirements, they should be
considered compact regardless of what they look like on a map. If they do not
satisfy these requirements, then they should be considered functionally noncompact.
From this perspective, the majority-black districts challenged in Shaw v. Reno
met this functional definition of compactness. Both were created as majority-black
districts to provide black voters an equal opportunity to elect candidates of their
choice, and the voters of both districts elected black representatives in the 1992
congressional election, Representative Eva Clayton in the 1st District, and
Representative Melvin Watt in the 12th District. There were no major complaints
that voters did not know their own districts for voting purposes or what candidates
were running in their district. Further, there are no published reports that after
Clayton and Watt were elected they were unable to provide adequate constituency
services because of the district boundaries.
The Court's emphasis on compactness poses the critical issue whether the new
equal protection claim fashioned by the Court in Shaw is nonjusticiable for lack of
objective, judicially-manageable standards for determining a violation and to guide
the lower courts in future cases. 19 0 In the past, Justice O'Connor has spoken out

Pamela S. Karlan, Maps and Misreadings: The Role of Geographic Compactness in Racial Vote Dilution
Litigation, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 173, 210-12 (1989) [hereinafter Maps and Misreadings].
190. The Court has long held that whether there are "judicially discoverable and manageable
standards" for resolving a claim is a critical element in determining whether a claim is justiciable, or
appropriate for judicial resolution. Nixon v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 732, 735 (1993) (quoting Baker v. Carr.
369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)). Just five months before the Shaw v. Reno decision, the Court in Nixon held that a
challenge by an impeached federal judge to the procedure by which he was tried in the Senate was
nonjusticiable, in part, because the use of the word "try" in Article. I, § 3, cl. 6 of the Constitution, the
Impeachment Trial Clause, lacks sufficient precision to afford any judicially-manageable standard of review of
the Senate's actions. 113 S. Ct. at 735-36.
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forcefully against recognizing any new constitutional claims in the absence of such
standards, and her concurring opinion in Davis v. Bandemer, 0 ' in which she
objected to making partisan political gerrymandering claims justiciable, reflects
those views. Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Rehnquist, strongly argued that "[t]he Equal Protection Clause does not supply
judicially manageable standards for resolving purely political gerrymandering

claims

...

.,,192

She embraced Justice Harlan's dissent in Baker v. Carrthat a lack

of such standards "is relevant not only to the question of 'justiciability,' but also,
and perhaps more fundamentally, to the determination whether any cognizable
10 3
constitutional claim has been asserted."
There is a conflict between Justice O'Connor's principled stance in Banderner
and her use of a compactness standard for adjudicating equal protection violations
in Shaw. Most scholars agree that there "appears to be no reliable test of whether
a districting plan is or is not reasonably compact."'0 Researchers have proposed
more than two dozen compactness measures, all of which have serious defects and
many of which are mutually inconsistent, vary widely in their evaluations of the
compactness of a given district, and result in high ratings to extremely oddlyshaped districts. 95
What is left is a vague and subjective "I know it when I see it'" 10 test that
provides little guidance for the lower courts concerning what district shapes violate
this new standard, little protection for minority voting rights, and great risk to the
advances in minority representation that have occurred since the 1990 Census.
Adopting such a vague standard could well permit the lower courts, now packed
with large numbers of conservative judges-many of whom are hostile to the
Voting Rights Act-arbitrarily to strike down large numbers of newly-created
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478 U.S. 109, 144-161 (1986).
Id. at 147.
Id. at 148 (quoting Baker v. Cart, 369 U.S. 186. 337 (1962) (Harlan. J.. dissenting)).
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(1988).
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Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, "Bizarre Districts." and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District
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majority-minority districts that fail to meet these judges' subjective standards of
symmetry or attractiveness. Indeed, since Shaw v. Reno was decided, three-judge
district courts have struck down newly-created majority-black and majorityHispanic districts in Louisiana, Texas, and Georgia. On remand, however, the
three-judge district court in the Shaw case, applying the principles established in
the Shaw decision, sustained the constitutionality of the districts. 1 7
What impressed the Shaw Court was that the shapes of the districts resembled
some of the gerrymanders of the past, but the reality is that gerrymanders come in
all shapes-regular and irregular-and the challenged plan provided greater racial
fairness than prior plans under which no black members of Congress had been
elected. Further, shapes alone can be deceiving. Although the majority inferred
from the odd shapes that the districts were "unexplainable on grounds other than
race," equally strong alternative inferences could have been drawn. As Justice
White points out in his dissent, there was an equally strong inference that the
districts had unusual shapes "for reasons unrelated to race," for example, to
protect incumbent members of Congress and preserve Democratic dominance in
the congressional delegation. 98 By concentrating on district shape as the essential
element of a Fourteenth Amendment violation, the Court makes itself vulnerable
to the charge that it has elevated aesthetics over the rights of minority
voters-protected both by the Voting Rights Act and the Fourteenth
Amendment-to equal opportunities for electoral representation.

VI.

IMPACT ON VOTING RIGHTS

ACT

ENFORCEMENT

In United Jewish Organizationsv. Carey, 99 the State of New York submitted
its legislative redistricting plan to the Justice Department for preclearance under
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, as did the State of North Carolina in Shaw v.
Reno, and the Justice Department objected to certain districts located in Brooklyn.
The State then created additional majority-black districts to satisfy the Justice

197. See supra note 18.
198. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2841 (White, J., dissenting). In a prior lawsuit, Republican plaintiffs charged
that the districts were a partisan political gerrymander designed to preserve Democratic hegemony In the
congressional delegation. The lawsuit was dismissed, not because there was no evidence that partisan motives
played a role, but because plaintiffs failed to satisfy the stiff standards for proving political gerrymandering set
forth in Davis v. Bandemer. Pope v. Blue, 809 F. Supp. 392 (W.D.N.C) (three-judge court), affd mer., 113
S. Ct. 30 (1992).
199. 430 U.S. 144 (1977).
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Department's objection, but the new district lines split up a relatively small
Hasidic Jewish community between two new State Senate districts and two new
State Assembly districts. Plaintiffs from that community challenged the plan,
claiming that it violated their Fourteenth Amendment rights by diluting their
voting strength to achieve a racial quota and by drawing districts solely on the
basis of race.200
Construing their claims as claims of discrimination against white voters (rather
than against Hasidic Jews), the Supreme Court, by a 7-to-1 vote, affirmed the
lower court decision dismissing plaintiffs' complaint for failing to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted. Six Justices agreed that, absent actionable
discrimination against white voters, compliance with the Voting Rights Act
provided a complete defense to the creation of new majority-minority districts.
Justice White, joined by Justices Stevens, Brennan, and Blackmun, concluded that
implicit in the Court's previous voting rights cases is the proposition that the
Constitution does not prevent a State subject to the Voting Rights Act from
deliberately creating or preserving black majorities in particular districts in order
to ensure that its reapportionment plan complies with Section 5.201 Justice
Stewart, who concurred in the judgment, joined by Justice Powell, stated that
purposeful discrimination was a necessary element of a Fourteenth Amendment
claim, and that a legislative purpose of complying with a Justice Department
Section 5 objection "forecloses any finding that [the legislature] acted with the
20 2
invidious purpose of discriminating against white voters.1
The Court's subsequent decisions in the affirmative action cases provide
additional support for the reasoning of United Jewish Organizations.The Court in
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.20° indicated that race-conscious government
action is permissible to remedy "judicial, legislative, or administrative findings of
constitutional or statutory violations,"' 204 which included, according to Justice
Powell's decisive opinion in Regents v. Bakke, Justice Department objections
under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. 20 1 Prior to the Court's decision in
Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 0 which limited the holdings of those decisions,
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the Court in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC10 7 and Fulliove v. Klutznick 0 0
recognized that race-conscious programs, including minority preferences, would be
sustained if mandated by Congress in an area within the congressional power,200
which arguably includes the Voting Rights Act. Additionally, the Court in all the
affirmative action cases held that race-conscious action is justified to remedy the
effects of specific past and present discrimination against minorities, even without
210
a judicial or administrative determination of a civil rights violation.
The Shaw decision, by sustaining the white plaintiffs' equal protection claim in
circumstances very similar to those of United Jewish Organizations, seems to
contradict these prior decisions. North Carolina asserted that it drew both
majority-black districts to comply with the Voting Rights Act and specifically
created the new 12th District, the "1-85 district," to comply with the Justice
Department's Section 5 objection to its first plan.21 By failing to recognize that
North Carolina's interest in complying with the Voting Rights Act negates
plaintiffs' equal protection claim, 12 the Court's decision raises very serious
questions concerning Voting Rights Act enforcement and compliance.
As previously indicated, after the 1990 Census, state legislatures in seven states
adopted new majority-minority congressional districts to comply with the Voting
Rights Act. In North Carolina and Georgia, the state legislatures drew additional
majority-minority congressional districts specifically to comply with Justice
Department objections to prior plans. 2 3 Other states could reasonably infer from
those objections and from Section 5 objections to their own state legislative

207. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
208. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
209. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 564-66; Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 472 (Burger, J., joined by White
and Powell, JJ.), id. at 491, 510, 515-16 n.14 (Powell, J., concurring), id. at 517-20 (Marshall, J., concurring,
joined by Brennan and Blackmun, JJ.).
210. E.g., Croson, 488 U.S. at 491-93 (O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and White, J.), Id. at
518 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 478 U.S. 267, 280-82 (plurality opinion), Id.
at 286 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (1986); Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 484 (opinion of Burger, C.J., joined by White
and Powell, JJ.)
211. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2838 (White, J., dissenting).
212. In United Jewish Organizations,the Court held that the State's use of race in drawing districts to
satisfy the Justice Department's Voting Rights Act objection precluded plaintiffs' equal protection claim and
authorized dismissal of the action. 430 U.S. at 153-54, 162-65 (opinion of White, J.); id. at 179-89 (opinion of
Stewart, J.).
In Shaw, the Court merely suggested that compliance with the Voting Rights Act might constitute a
compelling state interest and therefore provide the State with a defense. 113 S. Ct. at 2830-32.
213. Parker, Voting Rights Enforcement, supra note 16, at 117.
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redistricting plans214 that their congressional redistricting plans would not be
precleared if, without strong justification, they failed to create additional majorityminority districts, where such districts could be drawn. Further, because Section 2
of the Voting Rights Act prohibits redistricting plans that have discriminatory
"'results" regardless of intent, even states not covered by Section 5 had an interest
in adopting new majority-minority districts to avoid charges that their plans
resulted in discrimination.
The Shaw decision does a great disservice to the Voting Rights Act and
voluntary compliance with the Act by putting state legislatures in a double bind. If
a state legislature makes a good faith effort to comply with the Act by creating
additional minority districts to comply with a Section 5 objection, to avoid a
Section 5 objection, or to avoid a Section 2 lawsuit, the State faces Shaw-type
lawsuits by white voters if a colorable claim can be made that the districts lack
compactness under an undefined, and possibly undefinable, compactness standard.
Shaw-type lawsuits in these circumstances, in effect, punish the State for
attempting to comply with the Voting Rights Act, and the mere threat of such
lawsuits may provide a strong disincentive against Voting Rights Act compliance.
On the other hand, if the legislature assigns a higher priority to complying with
Shaw and avoiding white voter lawsuits, rather than compliance with the Voting
Rights Act, and fails to create additional majority-minority districts that easily
could be drawn, the State exposes itself either to a Justice Department Section 5
objection or to a minority voter Voting Rights Act lawsuit, or both, that could
result in prolonged and very expensive litigation.
The Shaw opinion provides little guidance to state legislatures facing such a
double bind. In its discussion of possible State justifications for the creation of
additional minority districts, 15 the Court appears to have deserted its prior United
Jewish Organizationsframework, under which compliance with the Voting Rights
Act precludes an equal protection claim, and instead discussed the circumstances
under which creating minority districts would satisfy the strict scrutiny standard.
The application of this strict scrutiny standard makes the creation of odd-shaped
districts presumptively unconstitutional and shifts the burden to the State to
provide a strong justification for such districts. The Court acknowledged that
States have a strong interest in complying with the Voting Rights Act,210 but it did
not specifically decide whether efforts to satisfy a Justice Department Section 5
214.

Id.

215.
216.

Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2830-32.
Id. at 2830.
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objection would meet this strict scrutiny test. This is surprising because in most of
the cases brought under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, the Court has
217
sustained Justice Department Section 5 objections.
Instead, the Court engaged in a general discussion whether compliance with the
Section 5 "nonretrogression" principle would provide a complete defense to a
Shaw claim. The nonretrogression principle comes from the Court's decision in
Beer v. United States.21 8 Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act prohibits any voting
change that is racially discriminatory in purpose or effect. In Beer, the Court
interpreted the Section 5 "effect" standard restrictively to prohibit only voting law
changes that are retrogressive, that is, that diminish minority voting strength in
comparison with the existing voting system or redistricting plan.2 19
The Court in Beer stated that even if a redistricting plan was not retrogressive,
it could still violate Section 5 if "the new apportionment itself so discriminates on
the basis of race or color so as to violate the Constitution."2 2 0 Section 5 also
contains a savings clause providing that Section 5 preclearance of a voting law
change "shall [not] bar a subsequent action to enjoin enforcement" of the
change. 221
The Court in Shaw interpreted both the exception for unconstitutional
redistricting plans and the Section 5 savings clause to authorize equal protection
challenges by white voters to redistricting plans adopted to comply with Section 5
of the Voting Rights Act:
Thus, we do not read Beer or any of our other § 5 cases to give covered
jurisdictions carte blanche to engage in racial gerrymandering in the name of
nonretrogression. A reapportionment plan would not be narrowly tailored to
the goal of avoiding retrogression if the State went beyond what was
222
reasonably necessary to avoid retrogression.
This is a curious and strained reading of the Beer opinion and the Section 5
savings clause. The Court in Beer, in authorizing the Justice Department and the
D.C. district court to deny preclearance to a voting law change under Section 5 if
217. See, e.g., City of Pleasant Grove v. United States, 479 U.S. 462 (1987); City of Lockhart v. United
States, 460 U.S. 125 (1983); Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526 (1973).
218. 425 U.S. 130 (1976).
219. Id. at 141.
220. Id.; id. at 142 n.14.
221. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1988).
222. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2831.
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the change was unconstitutional, was not authorizing constitutional challenges by
white voters to nonretrogressive redistricting plans; the Court was discussing the
circumstances under which the D.C. district court or the Attorney General could
deny Section 5 preclearance to a voting law change, not when an independent
Fourteenth Amendment challenge could be brought. Similarly, the Section 5
savings clause clearly was intended by Congress to allow minority voters, for whose
protection the Voting Rights Act was adopted, to file independent minority vote
dilution challenges. For example, this includes challenges under the Fourteenth
Amendment or Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act to voting law changes that had
been approved by the D.C. district court or the Justice Department under Section
5 but that nonetheless were unconstitutionally discriminatory or violated Section
2.223

The Court had difficulty understanding how a State could justify the creation of
additional majority-minority districts to comply with Section 5, given that the
Section 5 nonretrogression principle only prohibits changes that diminish minority
voting strength. The nonretrogression standard by definition does not require a
covered jurisdiction to create any new majority-minority districts, only to preserve
the existing ones; therefore, under this interpretation the Court concluded that the
creation of additional majority-minority districts to satisfy Section 5 would always
be "beyond what was reasonably necessary to avoid retrogression."' But the
Court failed to note that nonretrogression is not the only legal basis on which the
Justice Department can lodge a Section 5 objection or on which the D.C. district
court can deny preclearance to a new redistricting plan. Under the "purpose"
prong of Section 5, and under the Beer ruling that Section 5 also prohibits
unconstitutional redistricting plans, the Justice Department may object under
Section 5, or the D.C. district court may deny approval, if a State fails to meet its
burden of proving that the plan was not adopted for a racially discriminatory
purpose. Thus, for example, Section 5 preclearance may be denied if the state
legislature considered redistricting plans that included additional majorityminority districts, but rejected them for racial reasons (or fails to convince the
Justice Department or the D.C. district court that the minority districts were not
rejected for racial reasons).22 5
223. See, e.g., Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 549-50 (1969); Gingles v. Edmisten. 590 F.
Supp. 345 (E.D.N.C. 1984), affid in relevant part sub nont. Thornburg v. Gingles. 478 U.S. 30 (1986); Major
v. Treen, 700 F. Supp. 1422 (E.D. La. 1988).
224. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2831.
225. The failure of states to satisfactorily explain why they did not adopt alternative redistricting plans
that created additional majority-minority districts, thus giving rise to an inference of discminatory purpose.
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In discussing Section 5 standards, the Court also overlooked the legislative
history of the 1982 amendments to Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and current
Justice Department regulations that authorize the Justice Department and the
D.C. district court to deny preclearance under Section 5 to nonretrogressive voting
law changes that violate the new Section 2 "results" test. When Congress was
considering the 1982 amendments, the question arose whether the Beer
retrogression standard should remain controlling under Section 5, especially in
light of the liberalized results test of Section 2. In amending the Act, Congress
indicated that it intended the Justice Department and the D.C. district court, in
reviewing voting law changes under Section 5, to bar implementation of changes,
even if not retrogressive, that violated the Section 2 results test. 2 0 Subsequently,
the Justice Department amended its Section 5 regulations to state that the
Department would object to voting law changes submitted for preclearance under
Section 5 "to prevent a clear violation of amended Section 2.' 'a27 Thus, the
legislative history of Section 2 and the Justice Department's interpretation of
Section 5, which the Court failed to note, authorize the Justice Department to
object to a redistricting plan that dilutes minority voting strength in violation of
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, even if the plan does not diminish existing
levels of minority voting strength.
In the absence of discrimination against whites or blacks, a State's need to
comply with the Voting Rights Act should constitute a complete defense to a claim
of racial redistricting. In prior decisions involving express racial preferences, the
Court indicated that the use of race would be justified when the governmental
body has a "strong basis in evidence" that remedial action is necessary or there is
"a prima facie case of a constitutional or statutory violation. ' 228 Under this
standard, to justify the creation of new majority-minority districts, a State would
not have to prove that failure to adopt these districts would violate Section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act, but only that it has a "strong basis in evidence" for believing
was a major factor in the Justice Department's Section 5 objections to congressional and state legislative
redistricting plans after the 1990 Census. Parker, Voting Rights Enforcement, supra note 16, at 117-18.
226. After reviewing the Beer standard, the Senate report stated: "In light of the amendment to section
2, it is intended that a section 5 objection also follow if a new voting procedure itself so discriminates as to
violate section 2." S. REP. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 n.31 (1982), reprinted In 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 189
n.31. For a discussion of why Section 2 standards should be applied in Section 5 proceedings, see Mark E.
Haddad, Getting Results Under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 94 YALE L.J. 139 (1984).
227. United States Department of Justice, Proceduresfor the Administrationof Section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965, as Amended, 28 C.F.R. § 51.55 (1994).
228. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. at 500 (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Edue.,
476 U.S. at 267, 274-75, 277 (1986)).
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that remedial action is necessary to avoid a Section 2 violation or that the facts
establish a prima facie case.
The Voting Rights Act justification for creating new majority-minority districts
should be even stronger, when, as in the North Carolina case, the Justice
Department has objected under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act to the state's
first redistricting effort; the Section 5 objection constitutes an administrative
determination under the Voting Rights Act that the prior plan did not meet the
Act's requirements and that boundary revisions are necessary. Unless the State
successfully challenges the Justice Department's objection in the D.C. district
court, the Justice Department's Section 5 objection is binding on the State, and
the State is required by the Voting Rights Act to revise the district boundaries to
satisfy the Justice Department's objection or risk the imposition of a court-ordered
229
plan.
However, the Shaw Court indicated that states have a strong interest in
complying with federal anti-discrimination laws only when they "are
constitutionally valid as interpreted and as applied.1 23 0 It is difficult to tell what
the Court meant by this. Does it mean that if a State independently decides that
the Justice Department's interpretation of Section 5 is incorrect, the State should
be free to implement a contested plan in the face of a Section 5 objection? Or does
it mean that if a State complies with a Justice Department Section 5 objection and
creates additional majority-minority districts, and a local district court231 in a
Shaw-type lawsuit determines that the Justice Department exceeded its authority
and misinterpreted the Voting Rights Act's requirements, the State's compliance
was erroneous and/or does not provide a defense?
District courts in Georgia and Louisiana have interpreted the Shaw decision to
say that a State may not rely on a Justice Department Section 5 objection to
justify the creation of additional minority districts, that the State has the burden
of showing that the Justice Department's Section 5 objection is valid, and that
local district courts have independent authority to determine whether the Justice
Department properly applied Section 5 in objecting to a redistricting plan and
requiring the creation of additional minority districts.2 3 2 This view fundamentally
229. McCain v. Lybrand, 465 U.S. 236, 246-47 (1984); Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S 544.
558-60 (1969).
230. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2830.
231. The term "local district court" refers to U.S. district courts in states covered by Section 5, in
contrast to the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.
232. Johnson v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. 1357, 1383-86 (S.D. Ga. 1994); Haps v. Louisiana, 862 F. Supp.
119, 123 & n.3 (W.D. La. 1994).
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contradicts both the statutory scheme established by Congress for enforcing the
Voting Rights Act and the Supreme Court's prior decisions severely restricting the
decision-making authority of local district courts in Section 5 enforcement.
Congress vested exclusive jurisdiction for determining the Section 5 validity of a
new redistricting plan in the Justice Department and, alternatively, the U.S.
District Court for the District of Columbia. The Supreme Court has held that the
jurisdiction of local district courts located in states covered by Section 5 is limited
to determining whether the change is a covered change and whether it has been
precleared. Local district courts are precluded from determining the validity of the
Section 5 objection or the constitutional or statutory validity of the objected-to
plan.2"' If a State believes that a Section 5 objection is invalid or unjustified, the
State's exclusive remedy is to file a Section 5 declaratory judgment action in the
D.C. district court and obtain a de novo hearing on whether or not the plan
complies. But absent such an action, states and local district courts may not
challenge the validity of a Justice Department Section 5 objection, and any
suggestion to the contrary defies the congressional mandate.
The Court's decision in Shaw has significant implications beyond the decennial
redistricting process and Voting Rights Act preclearance of new redistricting
plans, and may have an impact on minority voter lawsuits filed under Section 2 of
the Voting Rights Act challenging racially discriminatory redistricting and atlarge elections for dilution of minority voting strength. As discussed previously, the
Supreme Court in Thornburg v. Gingles established three essential elements for
proving a violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, the first of which is that
"the minority group must be able to demonstrate that it is sufficiently large and
geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district."2 3 '
The Court explained that this was necessary to show that the challenged dilution
of minority voting strength was redressable. If minority voters challenging
discriminatory at-large elections or redistricting could not show that it was possible
to create a majority-minority single-member district in which they would have the
potential to elect candidates of their choice, then the district court would be unable
to order an alternative redistricting plan that would alleviate the challenged vote
23 5
dilution.
The Shaw decision has produced conflicting decisions in the lower courts on

233. McCain, 465 U.S. at 246-47; United States v. Board of Supervisors of Warren County, 429 U.S.
642, 645 (1977); Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379, 385 (1971); Allen, 393 U.S. at 558-60.
234. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50.
235. Id. at 50 n.17.
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whether Shaw affects the elements of proof in Section 2 lawsuits. Although the
Supreme Court's reference in Gingles refers to the size and compactness of the
minority group, and not to the geography of the proposed single-member district,
some district courts after Shaw have imparted a compactness requirement into the
first element of the Gingles three-part test. These courts have construed the Shaw
decision to mean that any majority-minority single-member district proffered by
plaintiffs to satisfy this element must also satisfy the Shaw compactness
requirement, and have dismissed Section 2 lawsuits when plaintiffs failed to
produce alternative redistricting plans that satisfy a strict compactness standard. 2 0
Other courts, however, while accepting the premise that plaintiffs' alternative
districts must be compact, have rejected a rule that these districts must satisfy
strict standards of symmetry and attractiveness. For example, in Clark v. Calhoun
County, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of black voters'
Section 2 lawsuit challenging racial gerrymandering in county redistricting for the
reason that their alternative district was "unusual and illogical," holding that the
proposed district "is not nearly as bizarre as the district under consideration in
Shaw.' 2 37 Court decisions that add-by judicial fiat-a compactness requirement
to plaintiffs' burden of proof that is not supported by the statutory language or
legislative history of Section 223' create an additional barrier to minority plaintiffs
seeking relief from discriminatory at-large elections and redistricting plans. Nor is
this additional burden supported by the Shaw decision itself. In Shaw, the Court
used the unusual shapes of the districts to create an inference that the challenged
districts were racially determined, and "rationally cannot be understood as
anything other than an effort to separate voters into different districts on the basis
of race."2 ' However, in Section 2 litigation under the Gingles standard, plaintiffs
are required to engage in race-conscious redistricting to prove that remedial
districts are available. Because the use of race is required, the compactness or lack
of compactness of the proposed districts has no independent significance that
236. See, e.g., Houston v. Lafayette County, 841 F. Supp. 751, 762 (N.D. Miss. 1993) (plaintiffs'
proposed district results "in a lopsided, distorted, and disjointed geographic scheme"), vacated. No. 93-7750,
1995 WL 360321 (5th Cir. June 16, 1995); Clark v. Calhoun County, 813 F. Supp. 1189, 1197-98 (N.D.
Miss. 1993) (districts drawn in "an unusual or illogical manner"). rev'd. 21 F.3d 92 (5th Cir. 1994).
237. Clark v. Calhoun County, 21 F.3d 92, 95 (5th Cir. 1994). See also. Marylanders for Fair
Representation, Inc. v. Schaefer, 849 F. Supp. 1022, 1052-54 (D. Md. 1994) (three-judge court) (rejecting
defendants' objection to proposed minority district because district %as not more uncompact than many of the
districts in the state's plan, which had already withstood a state court challenge based on alleged violation of
state constitutional compactness requirement).
238. See Karlan, Maps and Misreadings.supra note 189, at 196-99.
239. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2828.
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implicates equal protection guarantees, unless the Court is prepared to say
minority plaintiffs in voting rights cases are constitutionally precluded from
meeting their burden of proof under Gingles. Of course, this cannot be true,
because the Fourteenth Amendment applies only to State actors, not private
plaintiffs, and thus there is no constitutional or other legal basis for applying the
Shaw compactness standard to private plaintiffs in Voting Rights Act cases in
meeting their Section 2 burden of proof.
This discussion points out once again, from a different perspective, the deeply
distressing implications of the Shaw decision for Voting Rights Act compliance.
When the Voting Rights Act requires state and local governments to create
additional majority-minority districts-either to remedy a Section 5 objection,
avoid a Section 5 objection, or avoid a potentially successful Section 2
lawsuit-and the resulting districts are irregular in shape, Shaw appears to create
an additional constitutional barrier to compliance by imposing a new constitutional
requirement that such districts must be narrowly tailored and justified by a
compelling governmental interest. To avoid any conflict between the obligations of
state and local governments under the Voting Rights Act and this newlyannounced equal protection standard, the Court has a responsibility to clarify the
extent to which Voting Rights Act compliance creates a complete defense to
Shaw-type equal protection claims. The Court failed to do this in the Shaw
decision, subjecting a number of states to extensive and costly Shaw-type litigation
and leaving the underlying conflict unresolved.

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

The Court in Shaw ran roughshod over a number of settled constitutional
principles previously regarded as among those most cherished by the conservative
justices who constituted the Court majority. Prominent among these is the
requirement of standing, which conservative members of the Court have long
thought imposes both constitutional and prudential limitations to prevent judicial
intrusion into areas in which there is no necessity for constitutional adjudication
and to preserve respect for the Court's authority as an institution. As Justice
Powell has written, in language that appears to be directly applicable to Shaw,

without such limitations
the courts would be called upon to decide abstract questions of wide public
significance even though other governmental institutions may be more
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competent to address the questions and even though judicial intervention may
be unnecessary to protect individual rights.24 0
Commentators have noted that the Court creates its own greatest crises when it
exceeds these self-imposed limitations on the exercise of its jurisdiction, whether
those limitations are characterized as Article III restrictions or merely prudential
concerns of judicial self-governance. 4 1 This is not to argue that there are never
occasions when necessity requires the Court to expand those limitations, but rather
that the Court should apply those limitations consistently and expand them when
necessary to protect individual rights and to redress demonstrated personal injury,
neither of which was present in Shaw.
In violating its own self-imposed limitations on adjudication, the Shaw Court
initiated a major new judicial intervention into the redistricting process that has
enormous political repercussions, which include upsetting the delicate political
balance achieved in redistricting after the 1990 Census. Prior to redistricting,
opponents of majority-minority districts argued that creating such districts would
harm minorities because the districts would siphon off minority voters from
existing racially-mixed districts which repeatedly elected liberal white Democrats
who supported the minority legislative agenda. Minority redistricting would create
additional majority-minority districts that would elect more minorities to
Congress, the argument went, but would result in the defeat of large numbers of
of Congress
liberal Democrats and increase the number of conservative members
242
elected from districts made whiter by minority redistricting.
However, despite the creation of an unprecedented number of majority-minority
congressional districts, few liberal white Democrats were defeated in the 1992
congressional elections as a result of minority redistricting.2" This was because the
redistricting mapmakers made a concerted effort both to create majority-minority
districts and to preserve white incumbents (sometimes of both parties) by clever
maneuvering of district lines that retained just enough of the core of the
incumbents' political bases to enable them to get reelected. 24' Thus, the unusual

240. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975).
241. See, e.g., IRVING BRANT,STORM OVER THE CoNsTmTtmoN (1936).
242. See. e.g., Richard E. Cohen, "Voting Rights Act Could Haunt Democrats." NATIONAL JOURNAL,
Jan. 4, 1992, at 36; Jay Matthews, "Color-Coded Congressmen," NEWSWEEK. Sept. 21, 1992. at 67-68;
Stuart Taylor, "Voting by Race," AMERICAN LAWYER, June 1991. at 50-51; Richard Wolf. "Mapmakers
Focus Minority Voting Power," USA TODAY, May !1,1992, at I IA.
243. Parker, Voting Rights Enforcement, supra note 16, at 118.
244. See, e.g., Vera v. Richards, 861 F. Supp. 1304, 1338-39 (S.D. Tex. 1994) (state policy of
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district shapes criticized in the Shaw decision represented political trade-offs
designed to satisfy the interests of both minority voters and incumbent
representatives, and these compromises blunted some of the strongest opposition to
minority redistricting from Democratic Party leaders.24 5 Subjecting these districts
to strict scrutiny because of their shapes not only upsets these political

compromises but also gives short shrift to the Court's previously-endorsed
redistricting principles of allowing states flexibility to preserve the reelection
chances of incumbents" 6 and minimizing federal judicial intrusion into the
2
legislative redistricting process except to remedy discriminatory vote dilution. 4
By equating nondilutive, extremely-irregular minority districts with racial
gerrymandering, the Court in Shaw redefined racial discrimination in redistricting.
This new definition focuses not on individual or group injury, but on the use of a
racial classification, which, "pose[s] the risk of lasting harm to our society. 240
This redefinition is defective because it is both underinclusive and overinclusive. It
is underinclusive because, as the previous discussion shows, discriminatory
districting can occur without irregularly-shaped districts. If irregularly-shaped
districts that produce an inference of racial segregation in redistricting are the test
of voting discrimination, many redistricting plans with compact districts that

protecting white Democratic Reps. Martin Frost and John Bryant was a motivation in drawing boundaries of
majority-black District 30), juris.statement filed, 63 U.S.L.W. 3388 (U.S. Dec. 1, 1994) (No. 94-805); Shaw
v. Hunt, 861 F. Supp. 408, 465-73 (E.D.N.C. 1994) (favoring partisan Democratic interests and protecting
white incumbents of both parties were significant factors in shaping the boundaries of the challenged districts),
juris. statement filed, 63 U.S.L.W. 3439 (U.S. Nov. 21, 1994) (No. 94-923).
245. After the 1994 congressional elections, however, some contended that carving out majorityminority districts was a major cause of the Republican sweep of the U.S. House of Representatives. Several
statistical studies, however, have refuted that contention. Thomas B. Edsall, Racial RedistrictingHad Minor
Role Nov. 8. Analysts Say, WASH. PosT, Dec. 27, 1994, at A4; Steven A. Holmes, Civil Rights Group
Disputes Election Analyses on Black Districts, N.Y. Timm, Dec. 1, 1994, at AIS; Allan J. Lichtman, Quotas
Aren't the Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 1994, at A23.
246. E.g., Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 740 (1983); Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 752-53
(1973).
247. See, e.g., Growe v. Emison, 113 S. Ct. 1075 (1993); Upham v. Seamon, 456 U.S. 37, 41 (1982);
Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 414-15 (1977); White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 795 (1973).
No Justices have resisted federal court supervision of redistricting more than Justice O'Connor, who In
strongly protested making political gerrymandering claims justiciable because it "opened the door to pervasive
and unwarranted judicial superintendence of the legislative task of reapportionment," Bandemer, 478 U.S. at
147, and Justice Sealia reiterated the principle that federal courts should defer to state courts because
"reapportionment is primarily the duty and responsibility of the State through its legislature or other body,
rather than of a federal court." Growe, 113 S. Ct. at 1081 (quoting Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 27
(1975)).
248. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2832.
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diminish the voting strength of racial or political minorities would escape
constitutional scrutiny. This new definition also is overinclusive because, as the
Shaw case demonstrates, a redistricting plan can have unusually-shaped minority
districts but also be racially fair in the sense that it reflects the relative voting
strength of whites and minorities without giving either group a disproportionate
upper hand.u 9
One of the principal questions generated by the Shaw decision is whether it
subjects all race-conscious redistricting to strict scrutiny or limits strict scrutiny
review to highly-irregular or bizarrely-shaped districts. After the decision, district
courts and individual judges differed on the proper standard to apply. A district
court in California and a dissenting judge in the Georgia case read the opinion as
limited to highly-irregular districts. 2 10 This view is supported by the Court's
description of plaintiffs' challenge to a redistricting plan "so extremely irregular on
its face that it rationally can be viewed only as an effort to segregate the races for
purposes of voting."2 51 The Shaw Court also stated that it had never held "that
race-conscious state decisionmaking is impermissible in all circumstances" and
"express[ed] no view as to whether 'the intentional creation of majority-minority
districts, without more' always gives rise to an equal protection claim.1 2 2 This
interpretation also seems to be supported by the fact that in Shaw the State freely
admitted that its plan was designed to create two new majority-black districts253
If the use of race per se constituted a constitutional violation, there was no need
for the Court to discuss the shape of the districts or remand the case to permit the
State to produce evidence that would "contradict" plaintiffs' allegation of racial
gerrymandering. 2 "
249. The Court used this measure of redistricting fairness in Gaffney v. Cummings. 412 U.S. 735
(1973), in which the Court rejected a political gerrymandering claim even though the state apportionment
board deliberately drew oddly-shaped state legislative districts along political party lines. The Court held that
the deliberate creation of districts based on party affiliation alone was insufficient to raise a Fourteenth
Amendment issue because the plan was politically fair in that it reflected "the relative strength of the parties
in locating and defining election districts." Id. at 752.
250. DeWitt v. Wilson, 856 F. Supp. 1409, 1412-13 (E.D. Cal. 1994) (three-judge court), Juris.
statement filed, 63 U.S.L.W. 3127 (U.S. Aug. 8, 1994) (No. 94-275). See also, Johnson v. Miller. 864 F.
Supp. 1354, 1395-97 (S.D. Ga.) (three-judge court) (Edmondson. J., dissenting). prob.Jurs.noted, 115 S. Ct.
713 (1994).
251. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2824 (emphasis added).
252. Id. at 2824, 2828.
253. Id. at 2828 (White, J., dissenting).
254. Id. at 2832 ("If the allegation of racial gerrymandering remains uncontradicted, the District Court
further must determine whether the North Carolina plan is narrowly tailored to further a compelling
governmental interest."); id. at 2830 ("[I~f appellants' allegations of racial gerrymandering are not
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However, most district courts after Shaw reasoned that if the shape of a
minority district can establish an equal protection claim because the shape
provides inferential evidence of the use of race in redistricting, then direct evidence
provided by the testimony of legislators and others that race was a factor in
drawing the district lines should also invoke strict scrutiny.2 5 5 The views of these
courts that all "race-conscious redistricting" 25 8 or districts in which "race was the
overriding,predominantforce" 257 are subject to strict scrutiny constitute a direct
challenge to the Supreme Court majority's apparent effort to limit equal protection
claims to bizarrely-shaped districts. If, as in the Bakke case, 258 the Shaw standard
is in effect a compromise between those Justices who want to outlaw all raceconscious redistricting and those who want to permit the use of race in a limited
manner, then the contours of this compromise quickly began to unravel in the
lower courts. The Court will have to determine whether equal protection
challenges to minority districts should be restricted to highly-irregular districts or
whether all race-conscious redistricting should be subject to strict scrutiny. If the
Court decides on the latter course, it could have dire consequences for the future
of minority representation in Congress and in state and local government.
The Court's new equal protection standard also is likely to defeat the expressed
goal of color-blind redistricting in which "race no longer matters." 59 By allowing
white voters to challenge districts whose shapes suggest "an effort to segregate
voters because of their race," the Court's new standard requires a heightened raceconsciousness. -State legislatures may draw districts of whatever shape to secure
representation for distinct geographical regions of the state; establish distinct
socioeconomic regions, such as urban areas and rural areas; and preserve the core
constituencies of existing districts without raising any constitutional issues. But the

contradicted on remand, the District Court must determine whether the General Assembly's reapportionment
plan satisfies strict scrutiny.").
255. Johnson v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. 1354, 1371-74 (S.D. Ga. 1994), prob.juris noted, 115 S. Ct. 713
(1995); Hays v. Louisiana, 839 F. Supp. 1188, 1194-96, 1204-05 (W.D. La. 1993), vacated and remanded,
114 S. Ct. 2731, on remand, 862 F. Supp. 119, 122-23 (W.D. La.), prob. jurls. noted, 115 S. Ct. 687 (1994);
Shaw v. Hunt, 861 F. Supp. 408, 427-34 (E.D.N.C. 1994), juris. statement filed, 63 U.S.L.W. 3439 (U.S.
Nov. 21, 1994) (No. 94-923). In the Texas case, Vera v. Richards, 861 F. Supp. 1304 (S.D. Tex. 1994), Jurls.
statement filed, 63 U.S.L.W. 3388 (U.S. Dec. 1, 1994) (No. 94-805), the district court suggested that Shaw
was confined to irregularly-shaped districts but also in striking down three minority districts considered direct
evidence from legislators that race was used in drawing the districts. Id. at 1337-41.
256. Hays, 862 F. Supp. at 122.
257. Johnson, 864 F. Supp. at 1372.
258. See JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JusTicE LEwis F. POWELL, JR. 455-501 (1994).
259. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2832.
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Court's decision singles out race as a special prohibited criterion in redistricting,
and, as it has been applied in the North Carolina case and other minority
redistricting cases, places unique constitutional restrictions on drawing majorityblack and majority-Hispanic districts because of their racial composition. This
forces state legislatures (and others) to become more race-conscious than ever in
drawing these districts. Now, state legislatures must subject every majorityminority district to special scrutiny to ensure that it meets the constitutional
restrictions regarding regularity of shape imposed by the Shaw decision. State
legislatures must take special measures in creating majority-minority districts that
are not generally applicable to other districts to avoid the irregular shapes they
might otherwise employ solely because of the minority-race composition of the
district. This case thus provides a striking illustration of the futility of attempting
to eradicate race-consciousness in society by applying judicial standards that are
themselves acutely race-conscious and that establish special prohibitions against
state action that benefits minorities.2"'

260. See David A. Strauss, The Myth of Colorblindness. 1986 Sup. CT. REv. 99. 108-13.

